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Electrical Torpedoes as a System of Defence.

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I have but recently returned from South America, and had an opportunity of reading two works on torpedoes, or submarine mines; one by Major R. H. Stotherd, R. E., and the other by Commander Fisher, R. N.

It is now nine years since the close of our civil war, and considering how rapidly things change in this fast age, and that we too must soon pass away, it is about time at least to commence to vindicate the truth of history; for much of the history of that conflict exists only in the memory of the actors therein, and if they die without recording their experiences the truth is lost.

At this day I think that my letter may be fairly read and considered; and that the impartial historian will give to my statements their due weight, the object being to establish my claim to having made the first successful application of electrical torpedoes or submarine mines as a system of defence in time of war, which system is now generally adopted in some modified form by all nations for the defence of harbors, rivers, &c., and their approaches, as well as for the approaches by land to any fortified position.

I do not know that I should ever have taken this step, but that the authors of the books to which I allude, as well as Colonel Chesney, R. E., in his "Essays in Military Biography," page 345, seem to turn their backs, with such a studied air, upon the practical source of electrical torpedo defences—defences which they do not conceal are becoming the chief reliance of all nations for the purposes above named.

The works of Major Stotherd, R. E., particularly the last edition, are valuable alike to the general reader, the officer of whatever service of his country, and to the young torpedoist; whilst those of Commander Fisher are rather elementary and wanting in practical

information to be sure ; but both of those authors would doubtless have it inferred that to England belongs the merit, whatever it amounts to, of having devised, *without material assistance*, an efficient method of torpedo defence. The fact is, however, that there is not a matter of any practical importance treated of by Major Stotherd in his late work on this subject, that was not understood and practiced where necessary in my torpedo department during the late war, except as to the new explosives ; and I assert that he could easily have ascertained these facts by making the ordinary inquiries that every author should make in order to place before his readers a correct and impartial work ; also that the facts already at his hand should have induced him to do so, for he quotes from the pamphlet on torpedo warfare, by Captain E. Harding Steward, R. E., whose constant mention of my name in connection with the *first* and only *success* of electrical torpedoes in war, showed Major Stotherd very clearly where the system originated.

And now for the evidence. First, let me say, that I purposely avoided entering into *detail*, until forced to do so, as to what *was done*, by the use of E. torpedoes during our civil war, not wishing to recall unpleasant scenes, but that I write now in gratification of a natural and proper ambition, recording the truth.

The first idea of using torpedoes on the Confederate side, originated I believe with the Hon. S. R. Mallory, Secretary of the Navy, and he directed the distinguished Captain M. F. Maury, L.L. D., to make experiments with a view to their general employment if practicable.

I was selected as his immediate assistant.

His work commenced in the spring of 1862, and continued for a few months only with electrical torpedoes.

He had arrived at no definite conclusion from his experiments, in any particular when he left the Confederacy for Europe, and I was ordered to take charge, subject to orders from the Navy Department only, and remained so until near the closing scenes of the war, when I was relieved in command by Captain J. Pembroke Jones.

The means used in my electrical torpedo defences differed in every essential particular from those used by Captain Maury in his experiments. The peculiar construction of the mines, the methods of fixing them in position and connecting them with the cables and batteries ; the determination of the quantities of powder to use at different depths and the effective areas, the batteries used for firing, and also for testing the mines, as well as the organization

and equipment of the stations from which the mines were controlled, all formed a complete system devised by myself.

The results of this system were that the *first vessels ever injured or destroyed in war*, by electrical torpedoes, were by the torpedo department operating under my immediate command, and I may add the *only* ones, that I am aware of.

Those who are not well acquainted with the history of our civil war will find ample proof of my statements on file in the Navy Department at Washington, as also by reference to Admirals Porter and S. P. Lee, and Commander W. B. Cushing, United States Navy, for the fact that an *efficient system* of torpedo defences did exist on the James river, during the war, and to the Hon. S. R. Mallory; Captain J. M. Brooke, inventor of the Merrimac, the Brooke Gun, and the deep-sea sounding apparatus; and also to Captain Wm. H. Parker, formerly Superintendent of the Confederate Naval School, that *I* organized and commanded these defences, and was the *first* to make them successful.

There are volumes of evidence to this effect that can be produced when necessary.

I hold letters from the three last named gentlemen, and from the late General R. E. Lee in reference to the efficiency of my torpedo department—also a letter from the Hon. S. R. Mallory, in which he says: "I regarded your service as equivalent to that of a well appointed fleet or army;" and this had reference only to the defences of Richmond.

In fact when the system was nearly completed and inspected in person by President Davis, General Lee, and Secretary Mallory, it was immediately decided to withdraw large numbers of troops from that quarter for offensive operations elsewhere, it being well understood that the Union armies could not advance without the assistance of the Federal squadron, which advance was for a long time effectually prevented by my system of submarine defences.

Many vessels were disabled or destroyed by mechanical or contact torpedoes, but such effect is known to be the result of mere chance, often as fatal to friend as foe, and produces no such demoralizing effect as the certain destruction which awaits any vessel attempting to pass electrical torpedoes.

In regard to the efficiency of the torpedo defences employed by me during the war, as compared with those of the present day, I have to say that I have been almost constantly on torpedo duty ashore and afloat since our war, making the subject a study in

several foreign countries and our own, and have not yet seen any material improvement or development of the original system, and if we were at war with any great naval power to-morrow, I should prefer to rely upon it when the hour of trial came.

There are several beautiful and ingenious methods devised by those who have had no practice in war, but my experience will not permit me to give them approval.

Now, if we are to consider *practical* success as the test of an *invention*, have I not a right to this? Am I not as much entitled to it as Morse to the telegraph? Howe to the sewing machine? Colt to the revolver? And as many other men to their inventions whose success did not carry with it the original conception of the *necessity* for the invention, nor the first attempts to carry out the idea, nor in whose inventions as patented is there one original *scientific* principle? It is the effect produced by art in combination, and this is the basis of ninety-nine out of a hundred patents.

And the first successful attempt to achieve an important physical object by original principles or art in combining those which are known, is the only test by which we can be governed in awarding a patent entitling one to an invention. If not, where shall we draw the line of distinction? How shall we proceed with a patent office?

In the year 1860, Congress adopted by an almost unanimous vote my invention for "lowering, detaching, attaching, and securing boats at sea," and directed the Secretary of the Navy to purchase the patent right for the use of the navy, which was done. The marine world had probably seen the *necessity* for such an invention since the days of Noah, and there is not one original mechanical principle in it. It is simply a combination. The invention was several years before the country, in scientific journals; was carefully examined and tested at sea in several ships by some of the best officers in the navy, and discussed during two sessions in Congress, yet I have never known any one to dispute my claim thereto.

The efficiency of electrical torpedo defences is so universally recognized at this day and they appear so simple to the *initiated*, that many of the "I know it" kind may exclaim, "Why I don't see any *invention* in the matter, for it has been long known that if a chance was got at a ship with so much powder under her, she was bound to go up."

But then if so simple, why did not Fulton or Bushnell, in the early history of our country, or the Russians during the Crimean

war, stamp the fact upon the times, so as to render it, as it is now, a system of defence that no nation *dares* neglect.

And how did it become so?

I trust to history for the answer.

If any one had to contend with the abuse and sneers, and ridicule whilst in the performance of torpedo duty day and night, that fell upon me during the war, he would realize that as late as the summer of 1863, some of the ablest men of the day did not regard torpedo warfare as worthy of consideration, and the very attempts of Fulton and of Bushnell, and of the Russians, were used by those men in argument that my attempt would also be fruitless.

Much of the light has to struggle through mediums of darkness and resistance, and gradually breaks in upon us. Our *theories* rarely assume a practical form, but as in many other circumstances so in naval and military matters we are controlled by theory (nearly every association having one of its own) until the *test*, the practice comes, and then in war see how the mist vanishes and light appears! Some have made the lucky casts and win.

Can any one think of a war that did not cause him to wonder at his own want of forethought? How weapons and methods are changed! How rank is capsized! How he came out of the struggle other rounds higher on the ladders of science and of art!

And every discovery of a new or improved weapon proves to be a step towards greater civilization and peace.

Apropos of the foregoing, I remember that a distinguished Admiral sent word to me when under a flag of truce during the war, that if I came down to his squadron again in a certain boat, (in which I had made the first successful attack with the "Lee—Spar—Torpedo") he would not respect the flag, as he did not acknowledge that I was engaged in civilized or legitimate warfare. This glanced from my armor as many a worse shot did from my *own side*, though for other reasons, for I felt that as *he* was the only sufferer then, he saw the matter from but one point of view, but that time would set it even as I replied in substance to *the officer*,
———"respite finem." The end indeed was not far off, for the official reports of the day were that the admiral took up my torpedo mines as the territory was conquered, and turned them against us; and certain it is that his squadron was soon after armed with the "Lee—Spar—Torpedo."

To those who know me, I trust that this letter is unnecessary, but then there is the world beside, and who knows how many in

it to set up a claim without having a knowledge of the facts? And those too who having that dangerous "little knowledge" may constantly employ it, as they have already done, until public opinion accepts it as its guide.

I cannot conclude without a few words more in reference to my ever kind and lamented friend Captain Maury. He went from the South to England, where he continued to make experiments in electricity applicable to torpedo warfare, and discovered a most ingenious method of arranging and testing torpedo mines, which I believe is his patent, and was shown me by him in the winter of 1864 and '65.

The fact that there was no *practical* result from his experiments the few months he carried them on in the South, is due simply to the want of time to organize his forces and collect material, though his experiments served to mark some of the shoals on the way, if not the channel to success. But even had he remained to develop the system, and given it the greater impress of his genius, no success in consequence could have added much to the world-wide fame he had already acquired.

To the Hon. S. R. Mallory, who always believed in the success of the undertaking from the first, and ever gave me a firm and kind support, and materially aided me with his advice; to Captain Jno. M. Brooke, then Chief of the Naval Bureau of Ordnance, and to my electrician, R. O. Crowley, I am in a great measure indebted for the success which I here claim entitles me to be known as having made the first successful application of electrical torpedoes, or submarine mines in time of war, and as a system of defence.

HUNTER DAVIDSON.

The Relative Strength of the Armies of Generals Lee and Grant.

[The relative strength of the Federal and Confederate armies is a matter of great importance, and its proper solution is surrounded by obvious difficulties. Even our own people are in profound ignorance of the great odds against which we fought, while Northern writers have persistently misrepresented the facts. We feel, therefore, that we will be doing valuable service in publishing in our *Papers* the following letter of General Early to the *London Standard* in reply to General Badeau, General Grant's staff officer and biographer.]

REPLY OF GENERAL EARLY TO THE LETTER OF GENERAL BADEAU TO
THE LONDON STANDARD.

To a people overpowered and crushed in a struggle for their

rights, there is still left one resource on earth for the vindication of their conduct and character: that adopted by England's great philosopher—an appeal to "foreign nations and to the next age." A persistent and systematic effort to falsify the truth of history has been made, since the close of the late war in this country, by the adherents of the United States Government in that conflict; and such a generous desire to vindicate the truth as that evinced by your recent articles upon the death of General Lee, has awakened a deep sense of gratitude in the hearts of all true Confederates. Presuming upon the kind sentiments manifested in your columns, I venture to ask the privilege of correcting, through the same medium, some of the gross errors contained in the letter of General Badeau, the late "military and private secretary to General Grant," which has been extensively copied from your journal into American journals.

In reference to the campaign of 1864 from the Rapidan to James river, General Badeau makes this remarkable statement:

"The calculation that Grant had three times as many men as Lee has been obtained by omitting Longstreet's corps altogether from the estimate, and by giving only Lee's force present for duty on the Rapidan; while in reckoning Grant's numbers, not only the present for duty are counted, but those constituting what, in military parlance, is called the total, which includes the sick, the extra duty men, and various others, invariably amounting, in any large army, to many thousands. Manifestly, either Lee's total should be compared with Grant's total, or Grant's present for duty with Lee's present for duty. But besides this, in order to make out Grant's army three times as large as Lee's, Grant's two forces in the Valley of Virginia and on the James river (each at least one hundred miles from the Wilderness) are included in the estimate of his strength; while the troops which Lee had in front of these separate forces of Grant are left out of the calculation altogether. I repeat that in the battle of the Wilderness Lee had about 72,000 engaged, while Grant had 98,000 present for duty—according to the confidential field returns made at the time by each general to his own Government, when no general would intentionally misstate or mislead."

That officers of Grant's army, after witnessing the terrible havoc made in their ranks by the small force opposed to them at the Wilderness, at Spotsylvania Courthouse and at Cold Harbor, should overestimate the strength of that force, is not to be wondered at,

but when the report of Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, the United States Secretary of War, made at the opening session of Congress for the years 1865-'6, is critically examined, it will be regarded as most surprising that General Badeau should have committed such gross blunders in regard to the strength of Grant's army. In order to expose those blunders, and to enable you to verify the extracts which I shall make from Mr. Stahton's report, I send you an official copy of that report printed under the authority of the United States Congress.

On page 3d of his report, Mr. Stanton says:

"The national forces engaged in the spring campaign of 1864 were organized as armies or distributed in military departments as follows:

"The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-General Meade, whose headquarters were on the north side of the Rapidan. This army was confronted by the Rebel Army of Northern Virginia, stationed on the south side of the Rapidan, under General Robert E. Lee.

"The 9th corps, under Major-General Burnside, was, at the opening of the campaign, a distinct organization, but on the 24th of May, 1864, it was incorporated into the Army of the Potomac.

"The Army of the James was commanded by Major-General Butler, whose headquarters were at Fortress Monroe.

"The headquarters of the Army of the Shenandoah, commanded by Major-General Sigel, were at Winchester." [It is not necessary to mention the other armies for my purpose.]

On pages 5th and 6th of his report Mr. Stanton says.


"Official reports show that on the 1st of May, 1864, the aggregate military force of all arms, officers and men, was nine hundred and seventy thousand seven hundred and ten, to wit:

Available force present for duty.....	662,345
On detached service in the different military departments.....	109,348
In field hospitals, or unfit for duty.....	41,266
In general hospitals, or on sick leave at home.....	75,978
Absent on furlough, or as prisoners of war.....	66,290
Absent without leave.....	15,483

Grand aggregate 970,710

"The aggregate available force present for duty May 1, 1864, was distributed in the different commands as follows:

*Department of Washington.....	42,124
100 Army of the Potomac.....	120,380

*Department of Virginia and North Carolina.....	59,139
Department of the South.....	18,165
Department of the Gulf.....	61,866
Department of Arkansas.....	23,666
Department of the Tennessee.....	74,174
Department of the Missouri.....	15,770
Department of the Northwest.....	5,295
Department of Kansas.....	4,798
Headquarters military division of the Mississippi.....	476
Department of the Cumberland.....	119,948
Department of the Ohio.....	35,416
Northern department.....	9,546
*Department of West Virginia.....	30,782
Department of the East.....	2,828
Department of the Susquehanna.....	8,970
*Middle department.....	5,627
 Ninth army corps.....	20,780
Department of New Mexico.....	3,454
Department of the Pacific.....	5,141
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	662,345

Mr. Stanton in this statement accounts for all the extra duty men, the sick in field hospitals and camp, the sick in general hospitals, prisoners and men on furlough, and the men absent without leave, and shows, exclusive of all these, an aggregate available force present for duty on the 1st of May, 1864, of 662,345 of which there were 120,380 in the Army of the Potomac, under Meade, and 20,780 in the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, making an aggregate available force present for duty under Grant, on the north side of the Rapidan, on the 1st of May, 1864, of 141,160, officers and men. Now, I ask what inducement was there, on the 1st day of May, 1864, just two days before Grant began his movement across the Rapidan, and four days before the commencement of the battle in the Wilderness, for the officers commanding Grant's corps, "intentionally to misstate or mislead" in regard to their available force, in the official reports which they made, or for Grant to give countenance to such misrepresentations by forwarding the reports, or for Stanton to mislead the Congress and the country in December, 1865, in regard to the strength of Grant's army? Does not this statement of Mr. Stanton's, taken from the official reports filed in the War Office, conclusively show that General Badeau has made a great mistake, to say the least of it?

But the latter says that "to make out Grant's army three times as large as Lee's, Grant's two forces in the Valley of Virginia and

on the James river are included in the estimate of his strength." Let us see how this is. Now, Mr. Stanton shows that there was in the "Department of West Virginia," to which the Valley of the Shenandoah belonged, an available force present for duty, on the 1st of May, 1864, of 30,782, and in the "Department of Virginia and North Carolina," from which the Army of the James came, an available force for duty of 59,139; and no part of the "Army of the Potomac" or of the "Ninth Army Corps" was in either department.

In General Grant's report, dated the 22d of July, 1865—a copy of which I am sorry I have not in a form to send you, but which is to be found in the official documents printed at large in book form by the 39th Congress—he gives a letter from himself to Major-General Butler, dated the 2d of April, 1864, and containing instructions for the approaching campaign, in which he says:

"You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty—I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men—to operate on the north side of James river, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gilmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department." These troops, under Smith and Gilmore, afterwards constituted the "Army of the James," under Butler. Grant also says in the same report:

"A very considerable force under command of Major-General Sigel was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. * * *

"General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men."

He further says:

"Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readi-

ness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May."

The movement under the immediate superintendence of Grant, on the Rapidan, begun in fact on the night of the 3d, with the Army of the Potomac and the Ninth Corps, and the foregoing extracts from Grant's report show that the armies under Butler and Sigel constituted no part of the force which Mr. Stanton sets down at 141,160, on the 1st of May, 1864. The above statement from Stanton's report shows that there was in the "Department of Washington," at the very same time, an available force for duty of 42,124, and in the "Middle Department" (at Baltimore) a like force of 5,627, making an aggregate force of 47,751 within a few hours' run of Grant's army by rail and steamboat. So that, with the force of 59,139 in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, and of 30,782 in the Department of West Virginia, Grant had, besides his army on the Rapidan, an available force of 137,672 to draw upon for his operations in Virginia, making in fact in all a force of 278,832 immediately available for that purpose, besides what could be drawn from other quarters where there was no hostile force to confront. That nearly the whole force at Washington and Baltimore was added to his army before it reached James River, is shown by the following extract from Mr. Stanton's report. On page 7 he says:

"Meanwhile, in order to repair the losses of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of the force designed to guard the middle department and the department of Washington was called forward to the front. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, in the absence of General Hunter's command, the enemy made a large detachment from their army at Richmond, which, under General Early, moved down the Shenandoah Valley, threatening Baltimore and Washington."

The reinforcements from Washington and Baltimore actually reached Grant at Spotsylvania Courthouse, where, he says: "The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th (of May) were consumed in manœuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington;" and this was before General Lee had been reinforced by a solitary man. In addition to these reinforcements, Mr. Stanton says, on page 46, near the conclusion of his report, that the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin, tendered 85,000 hundred days' men on the 21st of April, 1864, to be raised in twenty days, which were accepted, and the greater part of which were raised, and that they supplied garrisons and relieved experi-

enced troops which were sent to reinforce the armies in the field—some of the hundred days' men being sent to the front at their own request. In order, then, to substantiate his assertion that Grant's force for duty in the field at the Wilderness was only 98,000 men, General Badeau must show that Mr. Stanton has lied in the most willful and stupid manner, and without the slightest inducement to do so. His statement not only has this effect, but it also convicts General Grant himself of very gross blundering. The latter states in the outset of his report, which has already been quoted from, the strategic principles upon which he proposed to conduct the war, after the command of all the United States armies had devolved upon him, and says:

"From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

"These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out."

Yet, notwithstanding these views and purposes, and despite the preparations on such a grand scale for the campaign of 1864, as described by Mr. Stanton, with evident feelings of pride, on page 3 of his report, General Grant, according to General Badeau's statement, out of an aggregate force of 662,345 available men for duty, could only muster 98,000 to confront the most formidable army of his antagonist—that is, when the United States forces were larger than they had ever been before, Grant opened the campaign, in Virginia with a smaller army than any other Federal commander in that State, since the First Battle of Manassas, had ever before entered the field with, and that, too, according to General Badeau's estimate, against a larger army than General Lee had ever before commanded in an active campaign, except, perhaps, during the Seven Days' Battles around Richmond. General Badeau's recollections of the "Confidential field returns," mentioned by him, is evidently

very confused. It is very probable that when the battle in the Wilderness opened, on the 5th of May, between one corps of General Lee's army (Ewell's), and the Army of the Potomac, the infantry of the latter army amounted to about 98,000 men, as that would be about the proper proportion of that arm, the rest being cavalry and artillery—the Ninth Corps not coming up until the night of the 5th, and going into action for the first time early on the morning of the 6th, during which day also Longstreet's two divisions came up from near Gordonsville, where they had been for some time. This state of facts may account for General Badeau's mistake, as it can be explained on no other hypothesis.

Neither Stanton nor Grant have given any estimate of the loss of the army of the latter in this memorable campaign, but Mr. Swinton, who was a regular correspondent of a New York paper, in constant attendance with the Army of the Potomac, and who has published a history of the campaigns of that army, says, on pages 491-92 of his book:

"Grant's loss in the series of actions from the Wilderness to the Chickahominy reached the enormous aggregate of sixty thousand men put *hors du combat*—a number greater than the entire strength of Lee's army at the opening of the campaign."

In a note he gives the particulars of the loss of the Army of the Potomac in the various battles, and shows that his statement of Grant's loss is confined to that army and the Ninth Corps, and does not include any loss sustained by the reinforcements from Butler's army, which were at Cold Harbor.

Now, from this statement, if General Badeau is right in his statement of Grant's force, the conclusion is inevitable that the army of the latter was in effect destroyed; and if, according to Grant's famous remark, Butler had got himself into "a bottle strongly corked," the former, to use one of Mr. Lincoln's elegant expressions, had "buted his brains out against a gate-post." Perhaps it was fortunate for Grant that Butler was "hermetically sealed up at Bermuda Hundred," when he too was compelled to seek refuge at the same point, and wait for further reinforcements.

Having disposed of General Badeau's statement of Grant's force, I will now consider his estimate of the strength of General Lee's army.

A strange hallucination in regard to the strength of all the Confederate armies seems to have haunted the Federal commanders from the beginning of the war to its close. According to their estimates, there were few occasions on which they were not outnumbered.

bered, and this hallucination seems to have beset General McClellan with peculiar vividness during his whole military career.

The absurdity of the Federal estimates of our strength, at various times, will be apparent from the following statistics taken from the official census of 1860, as published by the United States Government: In the fourteen States from which came any part of the armies of the Confederate States, including Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, there was a white population of only 7,946,111, of which an aggregate of 2,498,891 was in the said States of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, leaving only 5,447,220 in the remainder of the Southern States, while there was a white population of 19,011,360 in the States and Territories indisputably under the control of and in sympathy with the United States Government from the beginning, exclusive of Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri. The strong hand of the military power was put upon Maryland in the very outset, by which her voice was suppressed before there was an opportunity of giving expression to it. That State furnished to the Confederate Army only one organized regiment of infantry for one year, and several companies of artillery and cavalry which served through the whole war, while it furnished a very considerable force, by voluntary enlistment and under the draft, to the United States Army. Kentucky undertook to assume a neutral position in the beginning, and by this means was soon brought under the control of Federal bayonets, and subsequently furnished a much larger force to the United States Army than she did to the Confederate Army. Missouri was in the outset taken possession of by military force, and her regular government was overturned and its officers driven out of the State. She furnished also a much larger force to the United States Army than to the Confederate Army. In fact, from their passage, the United States laws upon the subject of the draft were in full force in these three States, during the whole war, while the Confederate conscript act was never in force in either of them for a moment. In addition to this, the greater part of that portion of Virginia now called the State of "West Virginia" was disaffected, from the beginning, to the Confederate cause, and was very soon overrun and held by the United States forces. A large portion of East Tennessee was also disaffected, and at no time did the white population, from which the Confederate States had alone to draw their troops, exceed five millions, while the white population in its own limits, from which the United States Government drew its troops, exceeded considerably twenty millions. In addition to this, by large bounties, it was enabled to

draw very largely upon the population of other countries on this continent and in Europe, and it also obtained a large number of troops from among the slaves and free negroes of the South, and from the disaffected of those regions which were overrun by its armies. These facts, taken in connection with the further fact that the latter Government entered the contest with all the prestige attached to it as a well established and recognized power, an organized army and navy, possession of the seas and the seaboard, and unlimited resources of money and the materials of war, while the Confederate Government had in the outset to organize all its departments and its armies for the conflict, and was in a great measure destitute of arms, of a revenue, and of the materials of war, demonstrate the utter absurdity of the idea that the latter Government was, at any time, able to oppose to the main armies of its antagonist anything like equal numbers. To suppose that it was able, at so late a period as May, 1864, when so much of its territory was in the possession of its enemy, to oppose to the principal army of the United States under the command of its chosen Commander-in-Chief, at a point so near the capital of that Government, an army so nearly approximating in numbers the former, as stated by General Badeau, would argue a degree of energy and efficiency on the part of the Confederate Government and of imbecility on the part of the United States Government utterly unparalleled in the history of nations.

General Badeau, in the first paragraph of his letter, says: "My principal authority for the proposed corrections is that of General Lee himself." If he means by this that General Lee in person gave him the information upon which he makes his statements, then General Lee has given to General Badeau information which he has not only withheld from all his most intimate associates and friends, and the comrades who followed him so long, but which is entirely at war with his uniform statements in writing and conversation to those in whom he was accustomed to confide. If he means that he has any written statements or acknowledgments of General Lee, then he is challenged to produce the documents in General Lee's handwriting. The word of that gallant gentleman and Christian hero, to those who knew him, is as indisputable as Holy Writ, and he has invariably asserted, up to the time of his lamented death, that the force with which he encountered and fought Grant in the Wilderness was under 50,000 men, including all that Longstreet had brought up. In a letter from him which I have, and which was written on the 15th of March, 1866, he says:

"It will be difficult to get the world to understand the odds against which we fought;" and he has since in person assured me that the estimate which I had made of his force, in a published letter written from Havana in December, 1865, and in my published account of my own operations for the years 1864-'5—which was 50,000—exceeded the actual efficient strength of his army.

The returns of the Army of Northern Virginia, which are in what is called the "Archive Office" at Washington, are not accessible to me; but I have a printed copy of a letter written to the New York *Tribune* in June, 1867, which gives statements taken from the returns of the Confederate armies on file in said "Archive Office," which letter is understood to have been written by Mr. Swinton, the author of "The Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." I send that copy to you, in order that you may verify, by an examination of it, all my statements; and, if I appear a little prolix and tedious, I beg you to be patient, as I desire to show to you and your readers how officers of the United States army manufacture history.

In the first column of the letter to the *Tribune* you will find a table of monthly returns for the Department of Northern Virginia, which is in the following words and figures:

"Department of Northern Virginia, February 28, 1862—February 28, 1865.

DATE.	COMMANDER.	FOR DUTY.	PRESENT.	PRESENT AND ABSENT.
1862—February.....	J. E. Johnston.....	47,617	59,396	84,225
May.....	J. E. Johnston.....	[67,000]
June.....	R. E. Lee.....	[100,000]
July.....	R. E. Lee.....	69,559	94,686	137,030
August.....	R. E. Lee.....	[95,000]
September.....	R. E. Lee.....	52,609	62,713	139,143
October.....	R. E. Lee.....	67,805	79,595	155,778
November.....	R. E. Lee.....	73,554	86,583	153,790
December.....	R. E. Lee.....	79,072	91,094	152,853
1863—January.....	R. E. Lee.....	72,226	93,297	144,605
February.....	R. E. Lee.....	58,559	74,435	114,175
March.....	R. E. Lee.....	60,298	73,578	109,839
May.....	R. E. Lee.....	63,352	83,775	133,679
June.....	R. E. Lee.....	[100,000]
July.....	R. E. Lee.....	41,135	53,611	117,692
August.....	R. E. Lee.....	56,327	71,965	135,364
September.....	R. E. Lee.....	44,367	55,221	95,164
October.....	R. E. Lee.....	45,614	57,251	97,211
November.....	R. E. Lee.....	48,267	56,068	96,576
December.....	R. E. Lee.....	43,558	54,715	91,253
1864—January.....	R. E. Lee.....	35,549	45,189	79,602
February.....	R. E. Lee.....	33,811	39,563	68,435
March.....	R. E. Lee.....	39,407	46,151	79,392
*April.....	R. E. Lee.....	52,626	61,218	97,576
June.....	R. E. Lee.....	51,863	62,571	92,685
July.....	R. E. Lee.....	57,097	68,844	135,805
August.....	R. E. Lee.....	44,247	55,934	146,838
October.....	R. E. Lee.....	62,875	82,535	177,103
November.....	R. E. Lee.....	69,220	87,860	181,386
December.....	R. E. Lee.....	66,533	79,318	155,772
1865—January.....	R. E. Lee.....	63,445	69,673	141,687
February.....	R. E. Lee.....	59,094	73,349	160,411

This table, which must be understood as giving the returns at the close of the months specified, is believed to be a correct transcript so far as it gives the actual monthly returns which were made, but it is manifestly wrong where the estimates of the writer of the letter are given in lieu of the returns—which estimates are put in brackets in the letter itself. This is especially the case in regard to the estimates for the months of June and August, 1862, and for the month of June, 1863. The reason that no returns exist for those months is to be found in the fact that, at the end of June, 1862, and for some days into July, General Lee's army was engaged in battle with, or in pursuit of, McClellan's army; that at the end of August of the same year his army was engaged with Pope's army, and immediately thereafter moved into Maryland; and that at the end of June, 1863, his army was in Pennsylvania, where it engaged Meade's army at Gettysburg on the 1st, 2d and 3d of July. This condition of things at the end of those months prevented the regular monthly returns from being made; and the writer of the letter has taken advantage of the fact to greatly magnify General Lee's forces. The greatest force which the latter ever commanded in the field was that with which he attacked McClellan in June, 1862, and his entire effective force at that time did not exceed 80,000, if it reached that figure—including Jackson's command, and the troops held for the immediate defence of Richmond and at Drury's and Chaffin's Bluffs. The returns for July, 1862, show the strength of his army at the time of the movement against Pope; and all of that was not carried into the field against the latter, as at least two divisions were left to watch McClellan's army at Harrison's landing, and did not get up until after Pope had been driven into the fortifications around Washington. The returns for May, 1863, fully cover the whole force with which the movement was made into Pennsylvania, as no fresh troops arrived after these returns were made, and that movement began on the 4th of June.

It must not be understood that the returns contained in the foregoing table, even where correct, show the actual force which General Lee carried into the field. These returns are for "The Department of Northern Virginia," embracing all the troops north of James river, including those usually kept in the Valley, so that, in estimating the actual strength of the "Army of Northern Virginia," this allowance must be made. Referring now to the returns bearing on the question of General Lee's strength at the opening of the campaign in the Wilderness, it will be seen that, at the end

of August, 1863, the first month after the return from the Gettysburg campaign, the entire force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia was 56,327, while at the end of September it was 44,367. This decrease of 11,960 was caused by the departure of Longstreet's corps from the army during that month, two divisions of it going to Chickamauga, and the other (Pickett's) to the south-side of James river. The strength of that entire corps was then a little less than 12,000 for duty. The returns for March, 1864, show in the Department of Northern Virginia 39,407 for duty, while those for April show 52,626 for duty—this increase resulting from the return of the two divisions of Longstreet's corps (Field's and McLaw's afterwards Kershaw's) which had been at the battle of Chickamauga and afterwards on a winter campaign in East Tennessee, also of some detachments which had been on special service, and of furloughed men. These returns were made at the end of and for the whole month of April, and not on the 20th of the month as stated by General Badeau. Longstreet's two divisions had then returned and were embraced in said monthly returns, his third division being at that time in North Carolina and not afterwards rejoining the army until the 22d of May near Hanover Junction. These returns for April, 1864, which showed the condition of the troops in fact on the 1st day of May, embraced the force in the Valley which was confronting Sigel, and other outlying troops on special service north of James river. So that in reality General Lee's entire force with which he had to confront Grant's army, including Longstreet's two divisions, was under the aggregate of 50,000 present for duty. But General Badeau says that Longstreet's corps was not embraced in the returns of General Lee's army for April, 1864, and he says: "His (Longstreet's) field return of date nearest to the battle shows 18,387 present for duty. Now let us see how he arrives at this conclusion. Run your finger down the second column of the letter to the *Tribune*, until you get to the table of returns under the head "ARMIES IN THE WEST," and continue on down that table until you reach the "ARMY OF EAST TENNESSEE," under which heading you will find the following, which is all that is necessary for my purposes:

	DATE.	COMMANDER.	FOR DUTY.
1863.	October.....	Sam. Jones.....	7,975
	November.....	Sam. Jones.....	10,546
	December.....	J. Longstreet.....	15,342
1864.	January.....	J. Longstreet.....	18,667

1864.	February	J. Longstreet.....	19,010
1864.	March	J. Longstreet.....	18,387
1864.	July	S. B. Buckner.....	14,907

Now is it not apparent that this return for March, 1864, of the "Army of East Tennessee," showing 18,387 present for duty, being the identical number claimed as the strength of Longstreet's corps, is the very same return "of date nearest to the battle" which General Badeau attempts to palm off on the British public as the return of that corps? If he ever saw the actual returns, and was not using a mere extract from them, he must have learned that the two divisions of Longstreet's corps, which were with him in East Tennessee, constituted less than half of the "Army of East Tennessee," the residue being composed in part of a division of infantry which afterwards, under Breckinridge, met and defeated Sigel on the 15th of May in the Valley, and of a body of cavalry, a portion of which subsequently, under Wm. E. Jones, fought Hunter at New Hope or Piedmont in the Valley; and none of which troops accompanied Longstreet on his return to the Army of Northern Virginia.

After the discovery of this palpable attempt at imposition, is it necessary to notice any farther the statements of General Badeau? I will, however, state that the first reinforcements received by General Lee, after the beginning of the campaign in the Wilderness, were received at or near Hanover Junction on the 22d of May, when he was joined by one of the brigades of my division just returned from North Carolina, numbering less than 1,000 men, a force under Breckinridge from the Valley numbering less than 3,000 muskets, and Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, recently returned from North Carolina, and which with my brigade had been engaged, under Beauregard, against Butler on the south side of James river. These troops did not make up the losses at the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Courthouse, and in the meantime Grant had received considerably more than 40,000 reinforcements from Washington and Baltimore for his army.

In regard to the strength of General Lee's army at the time of the evacuation of the works covering Richmond and Petersburg, and of the surrender at Appomattox, it is only necessary to say that the returns for February, 1865, for the Department of Northern Virginia, afford no just criterion of the real strength of that army, as those returns included the forces in the Valley, and other outlying commands, not available for duty on the lines. Detachments

for the defence of Wilmington had been made during the winter, and General Lee's army was, at the time of the evacuation, the mere skeleton of what it had been, and its supplies and means were exhausted. Again, all the energies of the United States Government had been put forth, and Grant was at the head of an overpowering army, thoroughly equipped and appointed in every respect, and with the most abundant supplies of all kinds. Yet, General Lee conducted his retreat in the face of his enemy, and over roads almost impassable, for more than one hundred miles, and finally surrendered less than 8,000 men with arms in their hands. It is true that 27,805 men of his army were paroled, but the greater part of them were stragglers without arms, whose commands had been cut up in detail, teamsters, camp followers, and extra-duty men; and we fail to see in the statement of paroled men contained in Mr. Stanton's report, on page 44, the "tens of thousands also belonging to Lee's army" who General Badeau says afterwards came in and gave themselves up. Mr. Stanton in fact shows only 174,223 men who surrendered and were paroled at the close of hostilities in all the Confederate States.

Mr. Stanton, on page 30 of his report, shows that there were 2,656,553 men put into the United States service during the war, by calls on the States—that is, more than one-half of the number of the entire white population, young and old, male and female, to which the Confederate States had to resort for soldiers, while the author of the letter to the *Tribune* states that he judges (from the returns, I presume), that 600,000 in all were put into the Confederate service during the same period—that is, less than the available force present for duty in the United States army on the 1st of May, 1864, and at the close of the war. This estimate is very nearly correct, and fully covers our whole strength from first to last. Is anything farther necessary to show the tremendous odds against which we fought?

In view of the results, so far, of the unfortunate war now progressing between two of the greatest powers of Europe, nearly equal in men and resources, and each having the benefit of the most improved engines of war, may we not look the world squarely in the face, point to *our* struggle, and the sacrifices and sufferings we endured for the cause for which we fought, and challenge its judgment as to whether we are to be regarded as "rebels and traitors," who were seeking to overturn a "benign government?" In

conclusion, let me quote from the above-mentioned report of General Grant the following passage:

"General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers."

Thus wrote the General-in-Chief of the United States armies—the now President of the United States—on the 22d of July, 1865. Yet we have not had peace. The heel of the military power, supplanting all civil government, is scarce yet withdrawn from our necks, and our venerated and beloved commander has gone down to his grave with his great heart broken by the sufferings of his people—sufferings which he found himself powerless to relieve. We have just witnessed the elections throughout several States of this "Free Republic," some of which are called "loyal States," superintended by armed agents of the United States Government, backed by United States troops, for the purpose of perpetuating the power of the ruling faction, through the instrumentality of the ballot in the hands of an ignorant and inferior race. This thing has been tamely submitted to by the descendants of men who rushed to arms to resist the stamp act, the tea tax, and the quartering acts of the British Parliament. We look on in amazement at the spectacle presented, conscious that, come what may, we have done our duty in endeavoring to maintain the principles of our fathers, and aware of the fact that we are now powerless and helpless—our only earthly consolation being that derived from a sense of duty performed and the conviction that the world will yet learn to do justice to our acts and motives.

Very respectfully,

J. A. EARLY,

Late Lieutenant-General Confederate Army.

LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA, November 19th, 1870.

NOTE.—The marks of the index and of the asterisk, opposite certain items in the tables copied into this article, are mine.

**Memorandum of Information as to Battles, &c., in the Year 1864, Called
for by the Honorable Secretary of War.**

[The following paper, prepared originally in the office of the Confederate Adjutant-General, although only a rough draft, will be of interest, as showing how the results of the campaign of 1864 appeared to the Confederate authorities.]

CONFEDERATE SUCCESSES.

February 20—Battle of Ocean Pond, Florida. Enemy 12,000 strong; defeated with loss of 2,000 killed and wounded, 300 prisoners, 5 pieces artillery, 1,600 small arms, and 130,000 rounds of ammunition. Confederate loss about 200.

February 2 and 3—Operations against Newbern, North Carolina. No attack on the town was made, but the enemy lost 100 killed and wounded, 311 prisoners, 2 pieces of artillery, 2 flags, and a large quantity of clothing and camp equipage. Commander Wood captured and burned the enemy's gun-boat "Underwriter," of 6 guns. Confederate loss 55.

February 22—Whitemarsh Island, Georgia. Enemy repulsed with loss of 30 killed and wounded and 102 prisoners. Confederate loss 7.

March —Cavalry battles in North Mississippi. General Forrest drove back the enemy, inflicting on them a loss of 4,500. Confederate loss 1,200. Sherman retreated.

March 30—Paducah occupied by General Forrest. Enemy lost 300 prisoners.

April 12—Fort Pillow captured by General Forrest. Federals lost 700 killed and wounded and 300 prisoners. Confederate loss 75.

April 20—Plymouth, North Carolina, captured by General Hoke. Enemy lost 2,500 prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, 100,000 pounds meat, 1,000 barrels flour, 3 gun-boats and a transport. Confederate loss 350.

April and May—Battles of Mansfield, Pleasant Hill, Clentersville, Poison Spring, Marks' Mill and Jenkins' Ferry, in Trans-Mississippi region. Only a brief synopsis has been received from General Kirby Smith, showing the proximate result to have been: Enemy's loss 8,000 killed and wounded, 6,000 prisoners, 34 pieces artillery, 1,200 wagons, 1 gunboat and 3 transports. Confederate loss estimated at 4,500. Trans-Mississippi almost entirely delivered.

May —Battle of New Market, Virginia. Seigel defeated, with loss of 1,200 killed, wounded and prisoners. Confederate loss about 400. No official report.

May 4 to May 16—Battles below Petersburg, including battle of Drewry's Bluff (May 16), in which General Beauregard defeated the enemy decisively. Official report sent to Secretary of War 18th June, 1864.

June 10—Battle of Fishomingo Creek, Mississippi. General Forrest defeated the enemy, numbering 10,252. Their loss was 2,000 killed and wounded, 2,000 prisoners, 250 wagons, 18 pieces artillery, 5,000 stand small arms, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, and all their baggage and supplies. Confederate loss 493. The whole Confederate force engaged was 3,500.

June 12—Battle near Trevilian's depot, in which General Hampton defeated double his force under Sheridan, inflicting a loss of 1,200 killed, wounded and prisoners. Confederate loss 400.

July 2 to 11—John and James Islands. Enemy repulsed with a loss of 700. Confederate loss 35.

July —Battle of Monocacy, in Maryland. General Early defeated enemy under General Wallace.

September 16—General Hampton, at Sycamore Church, captured 2,486 head of cattle, with rout of Gregg's cavalry, taking 300 prisoners and a number of horses.

September and October—Recent operations of General Forrest in Tennessee, resulting in the capture of three towns and 3,200 prisoners.

May 5 to August 1—Battles between forces under General Lee and the enemy under General Grant, viz: Wilderness, Spotsylvania Courthouse, Po River, Jericho Bridge, Cold Harbor and Petersburg. In none of these battles were the Confederates defeated or forced from the field. No official reports have been returned. The losses on both sides cannot be accurately stated, but a recent statement of a Federal general (Naglee) has been published, which states that General Grant's losses in killed, wounded, prisoners and missing, amounted to 150,000 men. The Confederate loss probably amounted to 30,000.

August to October 14—Battles at Reams' Station, Staunton River Bridge, Davis' Farm or Weldon Railroad, Fort Gilmer and the Darbytown road, in which the enemy have probably lost in killed, wounded and prisoners, 10,000. Confederate loss probably 3,500.

October—Price's success in Missouri. General Early reported

successes in Valley, between Fisher's Hill and Strasburg, and near Thornton Gap. In addition to the foregoing, a large number of cavalry successes have been achieved by Forrest, Hampton, Wheeler, Morgan and Rosser, and brilliant partisan operations performed by Lieutenant-Colonel Mosby, resulting in the capture of many prisoners and much property from the enemy.

May to September—Battles between the Army of Tennessee, under General Johnston and General Hood, and the enemy, under General Sherman. These battles did not assume the form of general engagements. No official reports have been received. The Federal loss has been estimated at 50,000, the Confederate at 20,000.

CONFEDERATE REVERSES.

July 14—Battle of Harrisburg, Mississippi. Enemy attacked in entrenchments. Confederates repulsed with loss of 999 killed, wounded and missing. Enemy's loss probably 500. General Buford in command.

May 9—Cloyd's Farm. Confederates driven from the field. Afterwards, the enemy's forces, under Crook and Averill, were repulsed and compelled to abandon their advance. Enemy's loss 800; Confederate 538.

August 21—Weldon Railroad. Enemy succeeded in holding the road. Loss on each side about 2,000.

August 5 to September—Loss of Confederate steamers in Mobile Bay. Evacuation of Fort Powell and surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan. Confederate loss about 800.

July—Battle north of Waynesboro', Virginia. Confederates under General William E. Jones defeated. Enemy's loss about 800; Confederate 800. No official report.

August to September—Battle of Jonesboro' and fall of Atlanta. • Loss on each side about 3,000.

September 19—Battle near Winchester. General Early defeated. Confederate loss about 3,500; enemy's supposed to be 5,000.

September 24—Confederates driven from Fisher's Hill. Loss, 17 pieces of artillery; very little fighting.

September 29—Fort Harrison, below Richmond, captured. Confederate loss about 200.

October 2—Altoona, Georgia, attacked. Confederates repulsed.

October 9—General Rosser's cavalry defeated in Valley. Loss, 400 killed, wounded and missing, and 5 pieces of artillery.

In many of the foregoing cases no official reports have been re-

ceived. The information is, therefore, furnished from the best sources at present accessible. The number of battle flags captured has been large, but at present cannot be stated with any accuracy.

From the accounts which seem most entitled to credit the following estimates of results are given:

Confederate successes.....	37	
Federal successes.....	13	
Indecisive engagements.....	5	55
Loss of enemy in killed and wounded.....	226,630	
Loss of enemy in prisoners.....	38,613	
		265,243
Loss of Confederates in killed and wounded.....	52,946	
Loss of Confederates in prisoners.....	14,500	
		67,446

Diary of Captain Robert E. Park, of Twelfth Alabama Regiment.

[Continued from June Number.]

September 19th, 1864—Battle of Winchester. Early this morning our cavalry pickets on the Opequon were driven in, and it became evident that an attack was threatened. News came that the cavalry under Fitz. Lee and Lomax, and Ramseur's division of less than 2,000 infantry, were engaged by the enemy near Winchester, and Rodes' division left Stephenson's depot to go to their assistance. Gordon's division preceded us, and as soon as we reached Ramseur we were ordered to "forward into line," and almost as quick as thought we were rapidly hurried to the attack. General C. A. Evans' Georgia brigade meeting overwhelming columns of the enemy, was forced back through the woods, and the Yankees were pressing after them, demoralizing them considerably, and came near capturing some of our artillery, when Colonel Carter and Lieutenant-Colonel Braxton opened on them with grape and canister, and the Yankees halted and then fell back. As they began to fall back, Battle's brigade, which had formed in rear of Evans', rushed forward, and swept, with loud shouts, through the woods, driving the enemy swiftly before it. I commanded the right company of our regiment and brigade in the charge. Colonel Pickens was not far from me, and General Early himself rode near me as we entered the action. I lifted my hat to the old hero as we ran forward, and noticed how proudly he watched our impetuous advance. The enemy soon ran precipitately before us, and officers and men were in the utmost confusion. We raised our well known

"Rebel yell," and continued our onward run, for we actually *ran*, at our greatest speed, after the disordered host in our front. We could see they had a much larger force than ours, but we cared not for numbers. We had never regarded superior numbers since we entered service; in fact, rather enjoyed it. The victory was then the more creditable to us. We learned afterwards that the Sixth and Nineteenth Army Corps, with their full ranks and splendid equipments, were our opponents. As we moved forward we passed scores, yes, hundreds, of dead and wounded Yankees, and a large number of prisoners were captured. We passed entirely through the woods, and into the open space beyond, when we halted for a moment, and then formed our line in the edge of the woods. While the lines were being established, Major Peyton, A. A. G. to General Rodes, rode up, and an indescribable, unexplainable something, I know not what, carried me to his side as he sat upon his horse. I had heard nothing, not even a rumor nor whispered suggestion, yet something impelled me to ask, in a low tone, "Major, has General Rodes been killed?" In an equally low, subdued tone, that gallant officer answered, "Yes, but keep it to yourself; do not let your men know it." "Then who succeeds to the command of the division?" I asked. "General Battle," said he, and rode on to the next brigade. The dreaded news of Major-General Rodes' sudden death, at such a critical moment, distressed and grieved me beyond expression. There was no better officer in the entire army than he; very few as brave, skillful and thoroughly trained. His men regarded him as second only to General Lee, excelled by none other. Robert E. Rodes was born at Lynchburg, Virginia, and graduated at the Virginia Military Institute; served two years as assistant professor, and afterwards became chief engineer of the A. & C. R. R. of Alabama. He entered the army as captain of a company from Tuscaloosa, was elected Colonel of the Fifth Alabama Regiment, and soon after promoted Brigadier-General, and succeeded General Ewell in command of the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Alabama and Twelfth Mississippi regiments. The latter regiment was transferred, and its place supplied by the Third and Twenty-sixth Alabama regiments. He was wounded at Seven Pines and Sharpsburg. At Chancellorsville, in command of D. H. Hill's old division, he led the advance, and swept everything before him. His clarion voice shouting, "Forward, men, over friend or foe," electrified his troops, and they were irresistible. They pushed on, under his gallant leadership, and completely routed the panic-

stricken soldiers of "Fighting Joe Hooker." After Generals Jackson and A. P. Hill were wounded, General Rodes was in supreme command, but he modestly and patriotically yielded to General J. E. B. Stuart, who had been sent for by General Pendleton of the artillery. After this battle he was promoted full Major-General, and put in charge of Battle's, Ramseur's (now Cox's), Doles' (now Cook's), and Daniel's (now Lewis') brigades. General Rodes was a precise and somewhat stern military man, of resolute expression and soldierly bearing, and enjoyed the implicit confidence of his superior officers, as well as his troops. A fragment of shell struck him behind the ear, and in a few hours this brave, skillful and trusted officer yielded up his heroic life as a holocaust to his country's cause. He married the popular and accomplished Miss V. H. Woodruff, of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and left also an infant son, his namesake. The young and gallant Colonel S. B. Pickens, of the Twelfth Alabama, took command of the brigade as senior colonel. He has commanded it nearly the entire time since we left Richmond. He was wounded during the engagement. The enemy had Crook's full fresh corps, and all his heavy force of cavalry as a reserve, and they came to the rescue of the defeated and routed Sixth and Nineteenth Corps. Our ranks were very thin indeed, and our lines stretched out far too much. The enemy overlapped us for hundreds, I might say truthfully thousands of yards, and we had no fresh troops in our rear to come to our aid. Sheridan must have had six to our one, yet our weakened forces held their ground proudly and obstinately until late in the afternoon, when Crook's fresh division drove back our small cavalry force under General Fitz. Lee. General Breckinridge, with Wharton's attenuated division, repulsed them, but the troops soon became impressed with the horrible, unendurable idea that they were flanked, and began to retreat in confusion. Just before this idea became prevalent, Private John Attaway, of my company, was shot through the breast by a minnie ball, and called me as he fell to go to him, saying he was mortally wounded. I immediately began to walk from the right towards the left of the company, where Attaway was lying, bleeding and faint. I had gone but a few steps, and while raising my right foot was struck in the calf of the left leg by a minnie ball, which broke the small (fibula) bone, and badly fractured the large one. The ball flattened and came out sideways, severing muscles, veins, tendons and nerves. I was knocked down, but ordered two of my men to carry Attaway off the field, the

brave and faithful fellow urging them to carry me off first, declaring he would die anyway, and my life must be saved. However, I had him moved away to the rear before I consented for Privates P. W. Chappell and Tobe Ward to place me on my blanket and carry me to the rear. As I was borne back, Attaway called out for them to hasten with me out of danger, as bullets and shells and solid shot were falling thick and fast around us. His conduct was that of a true, magnanimous friend and generous soldier. Ward and Chappell carried me as gently and quickly as possible towards some ambulances in the rear. When we reached them we were told they belonged to the Louisiana brigade, and I was refused admittance into one. At this time the gigantic and brave Colonel Peck, who had been slightly wounded and retired from the field, rode up, and ascertaining the status of affairs, ordered the men to "take him up tenderly and put him in an ambulance," adding, "he is a wounded brother soldier, and must be cared for." I thanked the Colonel, but he, in his bluff, soldierly way, interrupted me, and said he "had done nothing but what I would have done for him." Bidding a last farewell to my faithful men,* I was driven to the Union Hotel, then turned into a hospital. The surgeons examined my wound, pronounced it a serious one, and dressed it, uncertain in their minds whether the leg should be amputated or not. In my own, I resolved I would die before submitting to its loss. The surgeons promised me, in event our army was forced to evacuate Winchester, to send me off in an ambulance, but, a few minutes after, shot and shell were fired into the hospital building, crashing resistlessly through roof, walls, chimneys, etc., and knocking down bricks, plastering, planks and splinters over the helpless wounded and dying, and the demoralized surgeons, hastily detailing two or three of their number to remain with the wounded, fled incontinently, forgetting, in their anxiety to escape capture, all thought of their promise to carry me along with them. Our scattered troops, closely followed by the large army of pursuers, retreated rapidly and in disorder through the city. It was a sad, humiliating sight, but such a handful of worn-out men could not successfully withstand such overwhelming odds. I never saw our troops in such confusion before. It is said that Mrs. General Gordon, Mrs. General Breckinridge, Mrs. Hugh Lee and other patriotic ladies ran impetuously into the streets, and eloquently pleaded with the retreating soldiers to cease their flight and stand and con-

* Chappell and Ward were both afterwards killed at Petersburg, Virginia.

front the advancing enemy. Night found Sheridan's hosts in full and exultant possession of much abused, beloved Winchester. The hotel hospital was pretty full of desperately wounded and dying Confederates. The entire building was shrouded in darkness during the dreadful night. Sleep was impossible, as the groans, sighs, shrieks, prayers and oaths of the wretched sufferers, combined with my own severe pain, banished all thought of rest. Captain Hewlett, of Company H, wounded in the thigh, lay on the floor beside me. Wat. Zachry, Sergeant Carr and Tom Crawford, wounded men of my company, made their escape from the city just as the Yankee cavalry entered it. A few noble ladies of Winchester ventured, with lanterns in their hands, to walk among the wounded and distribute sandwiches and cups of coffee, with cheering words of comfort and sympathy. One sweet Christian woman came to me, and stooping, placed her gentle hand on my pale forehead, and said: "My poor boy, you seem to be in much pain, though so quiet; take some refreshments, and to-morrow you shall have a better bed than this hard floor." I thanked her, drank some coffee, and inquired what she had heard of General Rodes. She told me his body had been saved and sent on to Lynchburg. Many of my wounded comrades wept aloud and bitterly on learning for the first time the fate of their brave and beloved commander. All seemed overcome with real, unaffected grief. Rodes was Early's right arm in the hour of battle and danger. General Godwin, of North Carolina, and Colonel G. W. Patton were killed, and General York, of Louisiana, lost an arm. The brave Captain Tom Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama, by whose side I have entered and stood in many a battle, was instantly killed. He was a younger brother of Colonel J. N. Lightfoot. The enemy lost Brigadier-General Russell killed, and Generals Upton, McIntosh and Chapman wounded. Report says that over 6,000 Yankee wounded are now scattered over Winchester in every available building. Private houses have been seized and turned into hospitals, and their inmates forced to seek other quarters. The churches, too, are used. It has been a victory bought at a fearful cost to them, if it be a victory at all.

September 20th—Surgeons Cromwell and Love, of North Carolina, and Surgeons T. J. Weatherly, of the Sixth Alabama, and Robert Hardy, of the Third Alabama, were left in charge of our wounded. Captain Hewlett and I were removed to a well ventilated room on the second floor, and placed on a comfortable mattress. A short

time after an elegant lady came in to see us, and inquired from what State we hailed. I replied, "Alabama," whereupon she said she had lost a favorite cousin, a captain in an Alabama regiment, killed at Seven Pines. He proved to be Captain R. H. Keeling, of my company, and the good woman, Mrs. Hugh Lee, a relative of General R. E. Lee, immediately proposed to take us under her special care, and to have us carried to a private house, where we would be better provided for. We gladly consented, and, after a brief absence, she returned with some litters borne by negroes, who still remained faithful to their owners, despite the corrupting influences of the Yankees, and we were carried to the law office once used by Hon. James M. Mason, our Minister to England, and his able and venerable partner, Mr. Clark. The office was on Main street, near Fort Hill, so-called from the remains of an old fort erected there in the days of the British General Braddock, and near the residence of Mr. Clark and his amiable Christian daughter, Mrs. Susan J——s. The latter sent us some appreciated delicacies, and made us a brief visit. I suffered much from my wound to-day. A party of Confederates, perhaps a hundred, marched by the office under guard on their way to some Northern prison. The sight was a painful one.

September 21st—Major Lambeth, Lieutenant W. H. Hearne, Sergeant Lines and Private Watkins, of the Fourteenth North Carolina, were brought to the office and quartered with us. Captain Frost, of the Fourth Georgia (from West Point, Georgia), died of his wounds in hospital. The ladies gave him much kind attention.

September 22d—Yankees are continually passing our door, and frequently stop to gaze curiously and impertinently at us, and ask rude, tantalizing questions. They do not wait to be invited in, but stalk in noisily and roughly. Their conversation is coarse and insulting.

September 23d—We have many conflicting and unreliable rumors of Early's movements. Six families in the vicinity of the office have agreed to alternately furnish us with our daily meals. They are those of Mrs. Jones, Mrs. Swartzwelder, Mrs. Burrell, Mrs. Kiger, Mrs. Snapp, and Mrs. Marsteller. Three times each day they send us very palatable and abundant meals, nicely cooked and of fine variety. Negro slaves bring them to us, and are very attentive and respectful, sincerely sympathizing with us in our sufferings, and openly declaring their purpose to remain with their mistresses (their masters are absent in the Southern army), and

not regard the seductive promises made by the Yankees to induce them to abandon their life-long friends and homes.

September 24th—Several pretty girls called to see us, and entertained us very agreeably by their charming conversation. Among them were Misses N. K—, G. C—, O. V—, J. T—, and L. and T. S—. They are true to the cause, and encourage us much. Our meals are most excellent, and the ladies very kind to us.

September 25th (Sunday)—All the churches in the city, except one, are filled with the Yankee wounded. Our surgeons say our wounded will not number over 500, while theirs is between 4,000 and 5,000, nearly ten times greater than ours. Their killed is said to equal our killed and wounded together. Verily, a costly victory for them!

Correspondence between Colonel S. Bassett French and General Wade Hampton.

The following letters are a pleasing illustration of the spirit of our noble women during the war, and of the courage with which they inspired our soldiers:

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DEPARTMENT,
September 22, 1862.

Brigadier-General WADE HAMPTON, *Commanding Cavalry Brigade:*

General—The women of Virginia, guided by unselfish patriotism, have been ready to sacrifice ease, comfort and even life in the great struggle for liberty. Their labors of love in clothing our army, their attendance upon our sick and wounded, their earnest and continuing invocation of Heaven's blessings on our arms have won, as they deserve, the admiration of the country. The fair ones of Fredericksburg, burning with impatient restraint under the temporary dominion of the enemy, have devoted a portion of the hours of their captivity, while their harps hung upon the willows, in weaving a guidon for their brave countrymen who have devoted themselves to the accomplishment of our independence. From this noble band of brothers they have selected you as the recipient of this token of their favor, in the abiding faith that it will be cherished by you and your brigade with a devotion akin to the sentiment which prompts the gift. They know that the honored name you bear will be a guarantee to them that the work of their hands will lead your gallant command to "Honor and Immortality."

I am only for a few days longer at these headquarters, and will deliver the "guidon" to your order.

I have the honor, General, to be, with high respect,
Your obedient servant,

S. BASSETT FRENCH,
Colonel and A. D. C. to Governor of Virginia.

HEADQUARTERS VALLEY DISTRICT,
Near Martinsburg, September 25, 1862.

Colonel—Under orders from General Hampton, I conducted to this point the escort detailed to receive and guard the guidon presented by the ladies of Fredericksburg to Hampton's Cavalry Brigade.

In your absence, the package containing the gift has been handed me by Major Paxton, with whom I have left General Hampton's note of thanks in reply to your letter.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THEODORE G. BARKER,
Capt. and A. A. General Hampton's Cavalry Brigade.

Colonel S. BASSETT FRENCH, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS HAMPTON'S BRIGADE,
September 24th, 1862.

Colonel S. BASSETT FRENCH, A. D. C.:

Colonel—Your letter informing me that you were charged by the ladies of Fredericksburg with a guidon to be presented to my brigade, has just reached me, and I beg you to transmit to the patriotic and noble donors our warmest and most grateful thanks for the high honor they have done us. Their beautiful gift shall indeed "be cherished by me and by my brigade with a devotion akin to the feelings which prompt the gift." It shall be cherished most sacredly; it shall be borne proudly; it shall be defended whilst there is an arm to strike in its defence or a heart to remember the noble women who gave it to us. And if it should not be our fortune to entitle ourselves to the proud motto emblazoned on its folds, and to win for ourselves "Honor and Immortality," we can at least promise that no breath of dishonor shall taint our sacred standard. Thanking you, sir, for the manner in which you have discharged the duty entrusted to you by my fair country-women of Fredericksburg, and again offering to them my most sincere thanks, together with my best wishes,

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

WADE HAMPTON,
Brigadier-General.

General Lee's Final and Full Report of the Pennsylvania Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg.

General Lee's report was originally printed in the *Historical Magazine* of New York, for February, 1869, and was reprinted by General Early in the *Southern Magazine* for August, 1862, with the following explanatory letter:

Editor of the Southern Magazine :

Sir—In the *Historical Magazine* for February, 1869, published by Mr. Henry B. Dawson, at Morrisania, New York, there is a copy of General Lee's report of the Pennsylvania campaign and the battle of Gettysburg. This report was furnished to the *Historical Magazine* by Mr. William Swinton, who says that it chanced to be on the person of one of General Lee's staff-officers at the time of the destruction of his headquarters papers on the retreat from Petersburg; but he declines to state how he came in possession of it. In a conversation with General Lee, in April, 1869, I was informed by him that he had received a copy of the report as published, and he said that the report was substantially correct, though he was at a loss as to how Mr. Swinton got possession of it. He stated that the report as prepared for the Adjutant-General at Richmond was with his other papers in the headquarters wagons on the retreat, and that when he found the wagons cut off and about to fall into the hands of the enemy's cavalry, he sent a courier to destroy all the papers; and he thought it possible that this paper may have escaped destruction and been picked up by some straggler or other person. After General Lee's death I received a copy of the number of the *Historical Magazine* containing the report from Mr. Dawson, and when in Baltimore in April, 1871, I showed it to Colonel Charles Marshall, who then informed me that when the report was written it was copied under his superintendence, and that the copy only was returned to General Lee, he (Colonel Marshall) retaining the rough draft, in which a number of corrections had been made. He also said that this rough draft as corrected happened to be with some of his own papers which he had with him on the retreat and at the time of the surrender, and thus escaped destruction; and that he loaned it to Mr. Swinton shortly after the close of the war, who, he supposed, copied it while in his possession, and was thus enabled to furnish the copy to the *Historical Magazine*.

There can then be no question about the substantial authenticity of the report; and as it is a document of great historical value, I request that it be published in your valuable journal, in order that it may be more accessible to the officers and soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Southern people, very few of whom have had an opportunity of seeing it, as the *Historical Magazine*,

though a very valuable and impartial publication, has scarcely any circulation in the South.

There is an error in the report as published in locating the entrenched position which my command assaulted and carried at the time of the capture of Winchester, on the *Newtown* road. It should be on the *Pughtown* road, which is on the northwest of Winchester, while the *Newtown* road (the Valley pike) is on the south of the town. This mistake was probably made in copying or printing the report, and I have made the correction to conform to the facts of the case by merely substituting *Pughtown* for *Newtown*. With this correction, the general accuracy of the report as now given will be recognized by all who participated in the memorable campaign into Pennsylvania, and it is eminently worthy of preservation as containing General Lee's own account of a campaign which has been much criticised by persons not well acquainted with the facts. If there are any variations between the published report and the original now in the hands of Colonel Marshall, he can make the proper corrections.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

J. A. EARLY.

June 29th, 1872,

We received a few days ago a very valuable confirmation of the substantial accuracy of this document, in the shape of a MS. copy of General Lee's report, found among the papers of Mr. Michael Kelly, who was a confidential clerk to General S. Cooper.

Mr. Kelly died about two years ago, and the lady who sends us the MS. (Mrs. Henry Pye, of Richmond,) says of him: "He was a young man of high character, unblemished reputation, and one in whom was placed the most implicit confidence."

As this report is of very great value and importance, and is not accessible to many who desire to see it, we will print it in full from our MS. copy, which was doubtless either the original copy sent from General Lee's headquarters, or a correct copy of that made in the office of General Cooper and preserved by Mr. Kelly.

It will be seen by comparison with the printed copy, which we have carefully made, that the MS. corrects several verbal errors in the printed copy (notably the one to which General Early calls attention, the printing of *Newton* instead of *Pughtown*), and supplies several paragraphs which the printed copy omits. These omissions refer to the conduct of our officers and men, and to our captures at Gettysburg.

With this explanation we give the report entire as follows:

PENNSYLVANIA CAMPAIGN.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
January, 1864.

General S. COOPER, A. & I. General C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:

General—I have the honor to submit a detailed report of the operations of this army from the time it left the vicinity of Fredericksburg early in June to its occupation of the line of the Rapidan in August.

Upon the retreat of the Federal army commanded by Major-General Hooker from Chancellorsville, it reoccupied the ground north of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked except at a disadvantage.

It was determined to draw it from this position, and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. The execution of this purpose also embraced the expulsion of the force under General Milroy, which had infested the lower Shenandoah Valley during the preceding winter and spring. If unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that we should at least so far disturb his plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season of active operations.

The commands of Longstreet and Ewell were put in motion, and encamped around Culpeper Courthouse on the 7th of June. As soon as their march was discovered by the enemy, he threw a force across the Rappahannock about two miles below Fredericksburg, apparently for the purpose of observation. Hill's corps was left to watch these troops, with instructions to follow the movements of the army as soon as they should retire.

The cavalry under General Stuart, which had been concentrated near Culpeper Courthouse, was attacked on the 9th June by a large force of Federal cavalry, supported by infantry, which crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's and Kelly's fords. After a severe engagement, which continued from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, the enemy was compelled to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving about five hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery and several colors in our hands.

General Imboden and General Jenkins had been ordered to cooperate in the projected expedition into the Valley, General Imboden by moving towards Romney with his command, to prevent the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio railroad from reinforcing those at Winchester, while General Jenkins advanced directly towards the latter place with his cavalry brigade, supported by a battalion of infantry and a battery of the Maryland Line.

General Ewell left Culpeper Courthouse on the 10th June. He crossed the branches of the Shenandoah near Front Royal, and reached Cedarville on the 12th, where he was joined by General

Jenkins. Detaching General Rodes with his division and the greater part of Jenkins' brigade to dislodge a force of the enemy stationed at Berryville, General Ewell, with the rest of his command, moved upon Winchester, Johnson's division advancing by the Front Royal road, Early's by the Valley turnpike, which it entered at Newtown, where it was joined by the Maryland troops.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.

The enemy was driven in on both roads, and our troops halted in line of battle near the town on the evening of the 13th. The same day the force which had occupied Berryville retreated to Winchester on the approach of General Rodes. The following morning General Ewell ordered General Early to carry an entrenched position northwest of Winchester, near the Pughtown road, which the latter officer, upon examining the ground, discovered would command the principal fortifications.

To cover the movement of General Early, General Johnson took position between the road to Millwood and that to Berryville, and advanced his skirmishers towards the town. General Early, leaving a portion of his command to engage the enemy's attention, with the remainder gained a favorable position without being perceived, and about 5 P. M. twenty pieces of artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Jones, opened suddenly upon the entrenchments. The enemy's guns were soon silenced. Hays' brigade then advanced to the assault and carried the works by storm, capturing six rifled pieces, two of which were turned upon and dispersed a column which was forming to retake the position.

The enemy immediately abandoned the works on the left of those taken by Hays, and retired into his main fortifications, which General Early prepared to assail in the morning. The loss of the advanced works, however, rendered the others untenable, and the enemy retreated in the night, abandoning his sick and wounded, together with his artillery, wagons and stores. Anticipating such a movement as soon as he heard of Early's success, General Ewell directed General Johnson to occupy with part of his command a point on the Martinsburg road about two and a half miles from Winchester, where he could either intercept the enemy's retreat, or aid in an attack, should further resistance be offered in the morning. General Johnson marched with Nicholls' and part of Stuart's brigades, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, with a detachment of his artillery, the Stonewall Brigade being ordered to follow. Finding the road to the place indicated by General Ewell difficult of passage in the darkness, General Johnson pursued that leading by Jordan's Springs to Stephenson's depot, where he took a favorable position on the Martinsburg road, about five miles from Winchester. Just as his line was formed, the retreating column, consisting of the main body of General Milroy's army, arrived, and immediately attacked him. The enemy, though in superior force, consisting of both infantry and cavalry, was gallantly re-

pulsed, and finding all efforts to cut his way unavailing, he sent strong flanking parties simultaneously to the right and left, still keeping up a heavy fire in front. The party on the right was driven back and pursued by the Stonewall Brigade, which opportunely arrived. That on the left was broken and dispersed by the Second and Tenth Louisiana regiments, aided by the artillery, and in a short time nearly the whole infantry force, amounting to more than twenty-three hundred men, with eleven stands of colors, surrendered, the cavalry alone escaping. General Milroy, with a small party of fugitives, fled to Harper's Ferry.

The number of prisoners taken in this action exceeded the force engaged under General Johnson, who speaks in terms of well deserved praise of the conduct of the officers and men under his command.

In the meantime General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, reaching the latter place in the afternoon of the 14th. The enemy made a show of resistance, but soon gave way, the cavalry and artillery retreating towards Williamsport, the infantry towards Shepherdstown, under cover of night. The route taken by the latter was not known until it was too late to follow, but the former were pursued so rapidly, Jenkins' troops leading, that they were forced to abandon five of their six pieces of artillery. About two hundred prisoners were taken, but the enemy destroyed most of his stores.

These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley, the capture of four thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number of small arms, twenty-eight pieces of superior artillery, including those taken by General Rodes and General Hays, about three hundred wagons and as many horses, together with a considerable quantity of ordnance, commissary and quartermaster's stores. Our entire loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and three missing.

MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA.

On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions, and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet left Culpeper Courthouse on the 15th, and advancing along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's gaps. He had been joined, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division.

General Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the gaps.

Hampton and Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazle rivers, in front of Culpeper Courthouse, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

On the 17th, Fitz. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to Snicker's gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed with loss, and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being threatened by another body coming from Hopewell towards Middleburg. The latter force was driven from Middleburg, and pursued towards Hopewell by Robertson's brigade, which arrived about dark. Its retreat was intercepted by W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Chambliss, and the greater part of a regiment captured.

During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command. General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following day, having repulsed on his march a cavalry force sent to reconnoitre in the direction of Warrenton. On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart, after a brave resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.

In these engagements the cavalry sustained a loss of five hundred and ten killed, wounded and missing. Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field.

The enemy's loss was heavy. About four hundred prisoners were taken and several stands of colors.

The Federal army was apparently guarding the approaches to Washington, and manifested no disposition to resume the offensive. In the meantime the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins' cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and with the remainder to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell, upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge, but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

On the 22d, General Ewell marched into Pennsylvania with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown through Chambersburg to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division, which had occupied Boonsboro, moved by a parallel road to Greenwood, and in pursuance of instructions previously given to General Ewell, marched

towards York. On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and on the 27th, encamped near Chambersburg.

General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left, while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage upon the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army on his route.

The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were therefore issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking, by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehannah at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of bridges above and below York, but on the approach of the troops sent by him to Wrightsville, a body of Militia stationed at that place, fled across the river, and burned the bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps. The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac and was approaching the South Mountains. In the absence of the cavalry it was impossible to ascertain his intentions, but to deter him from advancing further west, and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move towards Cashtown on the 29th and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden.

General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require.

The advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops.

Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being igno-

rant of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his single brigade, and returned to Cashtown. General Hill arrived with Pender's division in the evening, and the following morning, July 1st, advanced with these two divisions, accompanied by Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions of artillery, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist chiefly of cavalry.

The leading division, under General Heth, found the enemy's videttes about three miles west of Gettysburg, and continued to advance until within a mile of the town, when two brigades were sent forward to reconnoitre. They drove in the advance of the enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior numbers, and were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding one of the brigades, being taken prisoner.

General Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as Pender arrived to support him, was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery was placed in position, and the engagement opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second lines, and attacking his third with great resolution. About 2½ P. M. the advance of Ewell's corps, consisting of Rodes' division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road, and forming on Heth's left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh numbers of the enemy. Heth's troops having suffered heavily in their protracted contest with a superior force, were relieved by Pender's, and Early coming up by the Heidlersburg road soon afterwards took position on the left of Rodes, when a general advance was made.

The enemy gave way on all sides, and were driven through Gettysburg with great loss. Major-General Reynolds, who was in command, was killed. More than five thousand prisoners, exclusive of a large number of wounded, three pieces of artillery, and several colors, were captured. Among the prisoners were two Brigadier-Generals, one of whom was badly wounded.

Our own loss was heavy, including a number of officers, among whom were Major-General Heth, slightly, and Brigadier-General Scales, of Pender's division, severely wounded.

The enemy retired to a range of hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery.

It was ascertained from prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of the army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.

General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general en-

gement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains, to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour. In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon four miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, encamped about four miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, came up after the engagement.

It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to wait an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle therefore had become, in a measure, unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast, and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmettsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills abovementioned, as forming its northern extremity, and a third at the other end on which the enemy's left rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front the ground was undulating and generally open for about three quarters of a mile.

General Ewell's corps constituted our left, Johnson's division being opposite the height adjoining Cemetery Hill, Early's in the centre, in front of the north face of the latter, and Rodes upon his right. Hill's corps faced the west side of Cemetery Hill, and extended nearly parallel to the Emmettsburg road, making an angle with Ewell's. Pender's division formed his left, Anderson's his right, Heth's, under Brigadier-General Pettigrew, being in reserve. His artillery, under Colonel Walker, was posted in eligible position along his line.

It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to

drive in. General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's centre to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.

General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.

About four P. M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and soon afterwards Hood's division, on the extreme right, moved to the attack. McLaws followed somewhat later, four of Anderson's brigades, those of Wilcox, Perry, Wright and Posey, supporting him on the left in the order named. The enemy was soon driven from his position on the Emmetsburg road, to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of the ridge in his rear. He was dislodged from these after a severe struggle, and retired up the ridge, leaving a number of his batteries in our possession. Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot, and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but, having become separated from McLaws, and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division, they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back, and it being now nearly dark, General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of General Pickett. He disposed his command to hold the ground gained on the right, withdrawing his left to the first position from which the enemy had been driven. Four pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and two regimental flags were taken.

As soon as the engagement began on our right, General Johnson opened with his artillery, and about two hours later advanced up the hill next to Cemetery Hill with three brigades, the fourth being detained by a demonstration on his left. Soon afterwards General Early attacked Cemetery Hill with two brigades, supported by a third, the fourth having been previously detached. The enemy had greatly increased the strength of the positions assaulted by Johnson and Early by earthworks.

The troops of the former moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his entrenchments, part of which were carried by Stewart's brigade and a number of prisoners taken. The contest was continued to a late hour, but without further advantage. On Cemetery Hill the attack by Early's leading brigades—those of Hays, and Hoke under Colonel Avery—was made with vigor. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were dislodged from the cover of some stone and board fences on the side of the ascent and driven back into the works on the crest, into which our troops forced their way and seized several pieces of artillery. A heavy force advanced against their right, which was without support, and they were compelled to retire,

bringing with them about one hundred prisoners and four stands of colors. General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. When the time of attack arrived, General Rodes not having his troops in position, was unprepared to co-operate with General Early, and before he could get in readiness the latter had been obliged to retire from want of expected support on his right. General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes; but the latter deemed it useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack.

In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Maj.-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-Generals Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson and Barksdale, and Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, were wounded—the last two mortally. Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia.

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack.

The general plan was unchanged: Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter during the night reinforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his entrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about one P. M.

General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford Gene-

ral Longstreet further assistance if requested, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.

A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions which it was believed would enable them to silence those of the enemy.

Hill's artillery, and part of Ewell's, was ordered to open, simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely.

About 1 P. M. at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened and continued for about two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first, but towards the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, in two lines, Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scale's brigades under General Trimble.

The troops moved steadily on under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left-centre. His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss. The troops were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not pursue.

A large number of brave officers and men fell or were captured on this occasion. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Generals Armistead and Garnett were killed, and General Kemper dangerously wounded. Major General Trimble, and Brigadier General Pettigrew were also wounded, the former severely.

The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of Robertson and Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart with the remainder of his command would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal army with three brigades, and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able by that

route to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements.

He marched from Salem on the night of the 24th June, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Courthouse and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca creek in the evening. He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command. He now ascertained that the Federal army, which he had discovered to be drawing towards the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving towards Fredericktown, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pennsylvania, where he arrived on the 30th, but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body.

Supposing from such information as he could obtain that part of the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover. He reached Carlisle on the 1st July, when he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade under General Hampton encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown endeavoring to reach our rear.

General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town.

The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about eight hundred, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but one hundred and twenty-five, with all the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected our left. In this action Brigadier-General Hampton was seriously wounded while acting with his accustomed gallantry.

Robertson's and Jones' brigades arrived on the 3d July, and were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss sustained by the army, and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was therefore determined to withdraw.

The trains, with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport on the 4th July, part moving through

Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by General Imboden, and the remainder by the Fairfield road. The army retained its position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by the last named route. A heavy rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded its progress that Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, did not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of the following day. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and after an arduous march we arrived at Hagerstown in the afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th July.

The great length of our trains made it difficult to guard them effectually in passing through the mountains, and a number of wagons and ambulances were captured. They succeeded in reaching Williamsport on the 6th, but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of the high stage of water. Here they were attacked by a strong force of cavalry and artillery, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden, whose command had been strengthened by several batteries and by two regiments of infantry which had been detached at Winchester to guard prisoners, and were returning to the army. While the enemy was being held in check, General Stuart arrived with the cavalry, which had performed valuable service in guarding the flanks of the army during the retrograde movement, and after a short engagement drove him from the field.

The rains that had prevailed almost without intermission since our entrance into Maryland, and greatly interfered with our movements, had made the Potomac unfordable, and the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by the enemy. The wounded and prisoners were sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry boats, while the trains awaited the subsiding of the waters and the construction of a new pontoon bridge.

On the 8th July the enemy's cavalry advanced towards Hagerstown, but was repulsed by General Stuart, and pursued as far as Boonsboro'. With this exception, nothing but occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up entrenchments along his whole line.

By the 13th the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was fordable, and a good bridge was completed at Falling Waters, new boats having been constructed, and some of the old recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to obtain reinforcements, and as it was found difficult to procure a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of the mills being interrupted by high water, it was determined to await an attack no longer. Orders were accordingly given to cross the Potomac that night—Ewell's corps by the ford at Williamsport, and those of Longstreet and Hill on the bridge. The cavalry was directed to relieve the infantry skirmishers and bring up the rear.

The movement was much retarded by a severe rain storm, and the darkness of the night. Ewell's corps, having the advantage of a turnpike road, marched with less difficulty, and crossed the river by 8 o'clock the following morning.

The condition of the road to the bridge, and the time consumed in the passage of the artillery, ammunition wagons and ambulances, which could not ford the river, so much delayed the progress of Longstreet and Hill, that it was daylight before their troops began to cross. Heth's division was halted about a mile and a half from the bridge to protect the passage of the column. No interruption was offered by the enemy until about 11 A. M. when his cavalry supported by artillery appeared in front of General Heth. A small number in advance of the main body was mistaken for our own cavalry retiring, no notice having been given of the withdrawal of the latter, and was suffered to approach our lines. They were immediately destroyed or captured with the exception of two or three, but Brigadier General Pettigrew, an officer of great merit and promise, was mortally wounded in the encounter. He survived his removal to Virginia only a few days. The bridge being clear, General Heth began to withdraw. The enemy advanced, but his efforts to break our lines were repulsed, and the passage of the river was completed by one P. M. Owing to the extent of General Heth's line, some of his men most remote from the bridge were cut off before they could reach it, but the greater part of those taken by the enemy during the movement, supposed to amount in all to about five hundred, consisted of men from various commands, who lingered behind overcome by previous labors and hardships, and the fatigues of a most trying night march. There was no loss of material except a few broken wagons, and two pieces of artillery which the horses were unable to draw through the deep mud. Other horses were sent back for them, but the rear of the column had passed before their arrival.

The army proceeded to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Darksville, when it halted to afford the troops repose.

The enemy made no effort to follow, except with his cavalry, which crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and advanced towards Martinsburg on the 16th July. They were attacked by General Fitz. Lee with his own and Chambliss' brigades, and driven back with loss.

When the army returned to Virginia, it was intended to move into Loudoun, but the Shenandoah was found to be impassable. While waiting for it to subside, the enemy crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and seized the passes we designed to use. As he continued to advance along the eastern slope, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad to Richmond, General Longstreet was ordered on the 19th July, to proceed to Culpeper Courthouse by the way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps by the enemy,

whose cavalry had already made its appearance. As soon as a pontoon bridge could be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed the river, and marched through Chester Gap to Culpeper Courthouse, where it arrived on the 24th. He was followed by General A. P. Hill without serious opposition.

General Ewell having been detained in the Valley by an effort to capture a force of the enemy guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Martinsburg, Wright's brigade was left to hold Manassas Gap until his arrival. He reached Front Royal on the 23d with Johnson's and Rodes' divisions, Early's being near Winchester, and found General Wright skirmishing with the enemy's infantry, which had already appeared in Manassas Gap. General Ewell supported Wright with Rodes' division, and some artillery, and the enemy was held in check.

Finding that the Federal force greatly exceeded his own, General Ewell marched through Thornton's Gap and ordered Early to move up the Valley by Strasburg and New Market. He encamped near Madison Courthouse on the 29th July.

The enemy massed his army in the vicinity of Warrenton, and in the night of the 31st July his cavalry, with a large supporting force of infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station and Kelley's Ford. The next day they advanced towards Brandy Station, their progress being gallantly resisted by General Stuart, with Hampton's brigade, commanded by Colonel Baker, who fell back gradually to our lines about two miles south of Brandy. Our infantry skirmishers advanced and drove the enemy beyond Brandy Station.

It was now determined to place the army in a position to enable it more readily to oppose the enemy should he attempt to move southward, that near Culpeper Courthouse being one that he could easily avoid. Longstreet and Hill were put in motion on the 3d August, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper. Ewell had been previously ordered from Madison, and by the 4th the army occupied the line of the Rapidan.

The highest praise is due to both officers and men for their conduct during the campaign.

The privations and hardships of the march and camp were cheerfully encountered and borne with fortitude unsurpassed by our ancestors in their struggle for independence, while their courage in battle entitles them to rank with the soldiers of any army and of any time. Their forbearance and discipline, under strong provocation to retaliate for the cruelty of the enemy to our own citizens, is not their least claim to the respect and admiration of their countrymen and of the world.

I forward returns of our loss in killed, wounded and missing. Many of the latter were killed or wounded in the several assaults at Gettysburg and necessarily left in the hands of the enemy.

I cannot speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accom-

panying reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defence they fell.

The loss of Major-General Pender is severely felt by the army and the country. He served with this army from the beginning of the war and took a distinguished part in all its engagements. Wounded on several occasions, he never left his command in action until he received the injury that resulted in his death. His promise and usefulness as an officer were only equalled by the purity and excellence of his private life.

Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett and Semmes died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that shrank from no danger.

I earnestly commend to the attention of the Government those gallant officers and men whose conduct merited the special commendation of their superiors, but whose names I am unable to mention in this report.

The officers of the general staff of the army were unremittingly engaged in the duties of their respective departments. Much depended on their management and exertion. The labors of the Quartermaster, Commissary and Medical Departments were more than usually severe. The Inspectors-General were also laboriously occupied in their attention to the troops, both on the march and in camp, and the officers of engineers showed skill and judgment in expediting the passage of rivers and streams, the swollen condition of which, by almost continuous rains, called for extraordinary exertion. The Chief of Ordnance and his assistants are entitled to praise for the care and watchfulness given to the ordnance trains and ammunition of the army, which in a long march and in many conflicts were always at hand and accessible to the troops. My thanks are due to my personal staff for the constant aid afforded me at all times on the march and in the field, and their willing discharge of every duty.

There were captured at Gettysburg nearly seven thousand prisoners, of whom about fifteen hundred were paroled, and the remainder brought to Virginia. Seven pieces of artillery were also secured.

I forward herewith the reports of the corps, division and other commanders, mentioned in the accompanying schedule, together with maps of the scene of operations, and one showing the routes pursued by the army. Respectfully submitted,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE, *General.*

Patriotic Letters of Confederate Leaders.

If it is fair to judge a cause by its representative men, then Confederates have no reason to be ashamed of the exponents of their principles.

We give below several letters, which show the high, patriotic

motives which animated our leaders, and which deserve a place in the history of the times, as illustrating the character of the "Rebels" and "Traitors" who were moving spirits in our struggle.

We quote the following from the columns of the *Richmond Enquirer* of November 21st, 1861:

A HIGH COURTESY FROM ACROSS THE WATERS.

We have the pleasure of publishing below a very interesting correspondence between the Grand Duke Constantine, Grand Admiral of Russia, and a distinguished citizen of our own State. It will be read with pleasure and pride. Pleasure, that so eminent a person in a distant empire should have paid such homage to science in the person of one of our own philosophers; and pride, that the flattering and generous proffer should have been so nobly responded to.

In the eyes of the wise and good, such respect as the Grand Admiral has thus exhibited for learning, adds a grace to royalty, and sheds lustre upon diadems. But this exhibition, we are informed, is only characteristic of him; for, of all the Princes of Europe, the Grand Duke of Russia is by far the most renowned for enlightened, liberal and progressive sentiments.

There is, indeed, no government in the world which is doing more for the advancement of science than the Russian Government is at this moment. In everything that relates to the sea, the improvement of navigation or the navy, her Grand Admiral is sure to be found where he ought to be, in the van, taking an enlightened and an active part. His largesses to science are dispensed with a princely munificence.

A private letter has, we understand, been received from a member of his household explaining in detail the exact relations in which he desires Lieutenant Maury to be placed towards the Government of Russia. They are those of perfect freedom. The pay and perquisites which he received in Washington are to be repeated in Russia without conditions. Should he desire to renew there the researches which have been interrupted in Washington, the most ample means and facilities for so doing are to be placed at his disposal; and should he at any time desire to return to America, he will be perfectly at liberty to do so. Indeed, it is desired that he should occupy very much such a position in Russia as Humboldt did in Prussia.

A most delicate and graceful compliment is this to our fellow-citizen; like that precious quality that is "mightiest in the mightiest," this invitation "blesseth him that gives and him that takes."

The reply of Lieutenant Maury is such as becomes the patriot. His first duty is to his country. When his native State is in danger and calls to him, he recognizes it as no time to seek ease and advantage in a distant land. The wooings even of philosophy are, under such circumstances, less attractive than the rude thunderings

of war. No time for visiting when the invader threatens the homesteads! Liberty and independence secured and peace established, he will appropriately manifest his high appreciation of the courtesy with which he has been honored. Till then he returns his thanks. Such is the spirit which his letter breaths, and it is in harmony with that of the people of his State and of the Confederacy.

Here is the correspondence:

ST. PETERSBURG, 27th July, 1861.
[8th August.]

My Dear Captain Maury—The news of your having left a service which is so much indebted to your great and successful labors, has made a very painful impression on me and my companions-in-arms. Your indefatigable researches have unveiled the great laws which rule the winds and currents of the ocean, and have placed your name amongst those which will be ever mentioned with feelings of gratitude and respect, not only by professional men, but by all those who pride themselves in the great and noble attainments of the human race. That your name is well known in Russia, I need scarcely add, and, though "barbarians," as we are still sometimes called, we have been taught to honor in your person disinterested and eminent services to science and mankind.

Sincerely deploring the inactivity into which the present political whirlpool in your country has plunged you, I deem myself called upon to invite you to take up your residence in this country, where you may in peace continue your favorite and useful occupations.

Your position here will be a perfectly independent one. You will be bound by no conditions or engagements, and you will always be at liberty to steer home across the ocean, in the event of your not preferring to cast anchor in our remote corner of the Baltic.

As regards your material welfare, I beg to assure you that everything will be done by me to make your new home comfortable and agreeable, whilst at the same time the necessary means will be offered you to enable you to continue your scientific pursuits in the way you have been accustomed to.

I shall now be awaiting your reply, hoping to have the pleasure of soon seeing here so distinguished an officer, whose personal acquaintance it has always been my desire to make, and whom Russia will be proud to welcome on her soil.

*Believe me, my dear Captain Maury, your sincere well wisher,
CONSTANTINE, *Grand Admiral of Russia.*

RICHMOND, VA., 29th October, 1861.

Admiral—Your letter reached me only a few days ago. It fills me with emotions.

In it I am offered the hospitalities of a great and powerful Empire, with the Grand Admiral of its fleets for patron and friend. Inducements are held out such as none but the most magnanimous

of Princes could offer, and such as nothing but a stern sense of duty may withstand.

A home in the bosom of my family on the banks of the Neva, where, in the midst of books, and surrounded by friends, I am, without care for the morrow, to have the most princely means and facilities for prosecuting those studies and continuing those philosophical labors in which I take most delight. All the advantages that I enjoyed in Washington are, with a larger discretion, to be offered me in Russia.

Surely a more flattering invitation could not be uttered! Certainly it could not reach a more grateful heart. I have slept upon it. It is becoming that I should be candid, and, in a few words, frankly state the circumstances by which I find myself surrounded.

The State of Virginia gave me birth within her borders; among many friends, the nearest of kin, and troops of excellent neighbors, my children are planting their vine and fig tree; on her green bosom are the graves of my fathers; the political whirlpool from which your kind forethought sought to rescue me has already drawn her into fierce and bloody war.

In 1788, when this State accepted the Federal Constitution and entered the American Union, she did so with the formal declaration that she reserved to herself the right to withdraw from it for cause and resume those powers and attributes of sovereignty which she had never *ceded away*, but only "*delegated*" for certain definite and specific purposes.

When the President elect commenced to set at naught the very objects of the constitution, and without authority of law, proceeded to issue his proclamation of 15th of April last, Virginia, in the exercise of that reserved right, decided that the time had come when her safety, her dignity and honor required her to resume those "*delegated*" powers and withdraw from the Union. She did so. She then straightway called upon her sons in the Federal service to retire therefrom and come to her relief.

This call found me in the midst of those quiet physical researches at the Observatory in Washington, which I am now, with so much delicacy of thought and goodness of heart, invited to resume in Russia. Having been brought up in the school of State-Rights, where we had for masters the greatest statesmen of America, and among them Mr. Madison, the wisest of them all, I could not, and did not hesitate. I recognized this call, considered it mandatory, and formally renouncing all allegiance to the broken Union, hasted over to the south side of the Potomac, there to renew to fatherland those vows of fealty, service and devotion which the State of Virginia had permitted me to pledge to the Federal Union, so long only as by serving it, I might serve her.

Thus my sword has been tendered in her cause, and the tender has been accepted. Her soil is invaded, the enemy is actually at her gates, and here I am, contending as the fathers of the Republic did, for the right of self-government and those very principles for

the maintenance of which Washington fought when this, his native State, was a colony of Great Britain.

The path of duty and of honor is therefore plain. By following it with the devotion and loyalty of a true sailor, I shall, I am persuaded, have the glorious and proud recompense that is contained in the "well-done" of the Grand Admiral of Russia and his noble "companions in arms."

When the invader is expelled, and as soon thereafter as the State will grant me leave, I promise myself the pleasure of a trip across the Atlantic, and shall hasten to Russia, that I may there in person, on the banks of the Neva, have the honor and the pleasure of expressing to her Grand Admiral the sentiments of respect and esteem with which his oft repeated acts of kindness and the generous encouragements that he has afforded me in the pursuits of science has inspired his obedient servant,

M. F. MAURY,

Commander Confederate States Navy.

To H. I. H. the Grand Duke Constantine,

Grand Admiral of Russia, St. Petersburg.

The following correspondence went the rounds of the press several months ago, but it should by all means be put in more permanent form:

GENERAL LEE'S LETTER OFFERING TO RESIGN—MR. DAVIS' REPLY.

[From the Mobile (Alabama) Sytle, January 29.]

"SECRET HISTORY."

Scribner's Monthly for February has an article entitled "A Piece of Secret History," by Colonel Charles C. Jones, Jr., of the late Confederate army, containing the following letter from General Robert E. Lee, written about a month after the disaster of Gettysburg, and offering to resign his command:

CAMP ORANGE, August 8, 1863.

Mr. President—Your letters of 28th July and 2d August have been received, and I have waited for a leisure hour to reply, but I fear that will never come. I am extremely obliged to you for the attention given to the wants of this army, and the efforts made to supply them. Our absentees are returning, and I hope the earnest and beautiful appeal made to the country in your proclamation may stir up the whole people, and that they may see their duty and perform it. Nothing is wanted but that their fortitude should equal their bravery to insure the success of our cause. We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come right in the end.

I know how prone we are to censure, and how ready to blame others for the non-fulfilment of our expectations. This is unbe-

coming in a generous people, and I grieve to see its expression. The general remedy for the want of success in a military commander is his removal. This is natural, and in many instances proper; for no matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops disaster must sooner or later ensue.

I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my return from Pennsylvania to propose to your Excellency the propriety of selecting another commander for this army. I have seen and heard of expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition. I do not know how far this feeling extends in the army. My brother officers have been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary to us that nothing should be risked to secure it. I therefore, in all sincerity, request your Excellency to take measures to supply my place. I do this with the more earnestness, because no one is more aware than myself of my inability for the duties of my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself desire. How can I fulfil the expectations of others? In addition, I sensibly feel the growing failure of my bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus prevented from making the personal examinations and giving the personal supervision to the operations in the field which I feel to be necessary. I am so dull, that in making use of the eyes of others I am frequently misled. Everything, therefore, points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon your Excellency from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader—one that would accomplish more than I could perform, and all that I have wished. I hope your Excellency will attribute my request to the true reason—the desire to serve my country and to do all in my power to insure the success of her righteous cause.

I have no complaints to make of any one but myself. I have received nothing but kindness from those above me, and the most considerate attention from my comrades and companions in arms. To your Excellency I am specially indebted for uniform kindness and consideration. You have done everything in your power to aid me in the work committed to my charge without omitting anything to promote the general welfare. I pray that your efforts may at length be crowned with success, and that you may long live to enjoy the thanks of a grateful people.

With sentiments of great esteem,

I am, very respectfully and truly yours,

R. E. LEE, General.

His Excellency Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States.

It so happens that we have in our possession the reply of President Davis to the above letter. Although its publication at this time was not contemplated, yet, since General Lee's letter has been made public, there is no reason for withholding the answer. We append it with the omission of only one sentence, which does not affect its general significance. The correspondence will illustrate the relations which prevailed between the two distinguished patriots, and is alike honorable to both:

PRESIDENT DAVIS'S ANSWER.

RICHMOND, VA., August 11, 1863.

General R. E. LEE, *Commanding Army of Northern Virginia*:

Yours of the 8th instant has just been received. I am glad that you concur so entirely with me as to the wants of our country in this trying hour, and am happy to add that after the first depression consequent upon our diasters in the West, indications have appeared that our people will exhibit that fortitude which we agree in believing is alone needful to secure ultimate success.

It well became Sydney Johnston, when overwhelmed by a senseless clamor, to admit the rule that success is the test of merit; and yet there has been nothing which I have found to require a greater effort of patience than to bear the criticisms of the ignorant, who pronounce everything a failure which does not equal their expectations or desires, and can see no good result which is not in the line of their own imaginings. I admit the propriety of your conclusions that an officer who loses the confidence of his troops should have his position changed, whatever may be his ability, but when I read the sentence I was not at all prepared for the application you were about to make. Expressions of discontent in the public journals furnish but little evidence of the sentiment of the army. I wish it were otherwise, even though all the abuse of myself should be accepted as the results of honest observation.

Were you capable of stooping to it, you could easily surround yourself with those who would fill the press with your laudations, and seek to exalt you for what you had not done, rather than detract from the achievements which will make you and your army the subject of history and object of the world's admiration for generations to come.

I am truly sorry to know that you still feel the effects of the illness you suffered last spring, and can readily understand the embarrassments you experience in using the eyes of others, having been so much accustomed to make your own reconnaissances. Practice will, however, do much to relieve that embarrassment, and the minute knowledge of the country which you had acquired will render you less dependent for topographical information.

But suppose, my dear friend, that I were to admit, with all their implications, the points which you present, where am I to find that new commander who is to possess the greater ability which

you believe to be required? I do not doubt the readiness with which you would give way to one who could accomplish all that you have wished, and you will do me the justice to believe that if Providence should kindly offer such a person for our use I would not hesitate to avail [myself] of his services.

My sight is not sufficiently penetrating to discover such hidden merit, if it exists, and I have but used to you the language of sober earnestness, when I have impressed upon you the propriety of avoiding all unnecessary exposure to danger, because I felt our country could not bear to lose you. To ask me to substitute you by some one in my judgment more fit to command, or who would possess more of the confidence of the army, or of the reflecting men of the country, is to demand an impossibility.

It only remains for me to hope that you will take all possible care of yourself, that your health and strength may be entirely restored, and that the Lord will preserve you for the important duties devolved upon you in the struggle of our suffering country for the independence which we have engaged in war to maintain.

As ever, very respectfully and truly,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865.

The following papers need no further explanation than that contained in Colonel Kean's letter. Their importance and value will be appreciated by all seekers after historic truth. We will continue their publication until all of them have been published, having regard to convenience in printing rather than to the order in which the papers are named in the list:

LETTER FROM COLONEL R. G. H. KEAN.

LYNCHBURG, November 15, 1873.

General JUBAL A. EARLY, *President Southern Historical Society*:

My Dear Sir—I herewith deliver to your society, through you, the accompanying papers, which possess considerable historical interest, and ought, I think, to be in the possession of your society.

The history of them is as follows: When General J. C. Breckinridge took charge of the War Office as Secretary of War, succeeding Honorable James A. Seddon on the 7th February, 1865, his first steps, taken at the suggestion of Judge John A. Campbell, Assistant Secretary of War, was to address a circular letter to each of the Chiefs of Bureaus in the War Department, calling on them for information of the state of the service in their respective branches. Similar letters were addressed at the same time to Generals Lee and J. E. Johnston, asking for authentic reports of the status of their armies and the prospects before them.

Responses were made, which were kept together in a bundle in the War Office, of which as Chief of the Bureau of War I had

charge, and these important and confidential papers General Breckinridge requested me to keep in my personal custody. At the evacuation of Richmond, on the 2d April, 1865, I placed this bundle in a particular position in one of the cases in which I packed all the papers of the War Office, so that I could easily place my hand upon them. On the 26th April, 1865, General Johnston having surrendered, and being about to return to Virginia again, at General Breckinridge's instance, I took the bundle of reports, abovementioned, out of the case in which I had carried it from Richmond to Charlotte, and (leaving all the other books and papers of the War Office stored in a warehouse in Charlotte, where they were found by the Federals and transferred to the "Bureau of Rebel Archives" in Washington), brought it on my person back to Virginia.

In May or June, 1865, not long after I reached Albemarle county, Virginia, an order was published by, I think, General Halleck, requiring all Confederate documents to be turned in, on pain of being severely dealt with. Before complying with this order (which I greatly regret now that I complied with at all), I copied with the assistance of some friends each report. I *personally* compared every one, whether transcribed by my own hand or that of another, in order to be able to attest the accuracy of the copy. Having completed the copies, I delivered the originals in person to the colonel commanding at Charlottesville, to be forwarded to headquarters at Richmond. I never knew whether this was done or not, but from the interesting character especially of the letters of Generals Lee and Johnston, I expected to see some mention of them, which I have never seen.

The copies I retained. In October, 1865, having occasion to visit Lexington, Virginia, and having heard that General Lee was engaged in preparing a Memoir of the Army of Northern Virginia, and supposing that the copies I had of his own and General Johnston's reply to the letter of the Secretary would be useful to him in that work, I took them with me to Lexington, and gave them to him.

The Reports of the Heads of Bureaus, viz: The Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, Surgeon-General, and Bureau of Foreign Supplies, I hand you with this letter. The foregoing account is given that the accuracy of the copies and the authenticity of the reports may be avouched, which I do explicitly.

Respectfully, your friend and servant,

R. G. H. KEAN.

[Copy.]

WAR OFFICE, February 7, 1865.

Circular.

The Secretary of War desires that you will prepare at once, for his information, a succinct but clear statement of the means and resources you have on hand for carrying on the business of your

bureau, and your ability for carrying it on, what impediments exist, and what is necessary for that purpose. Respectfully,
(Signed)

R. G. H. KEAN,
Chief of Bureau of War.

Brigadier-General J. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance.

REPORT OF GENERAL J. GORGAS, CHIEF OF ORDNANCE.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, Richmond, February 9th, 1865.

Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Secretary of War:*

Sir—In reply to your circular of 7th February (received yesterday) I have the honor to enclose copies of "Annual Report," marked No. 1, "Special Report of December 31, 1864," No. 2, and "Report of Operatives, Whites and Slaves, needed," No. 3.

No. 2 contains all the information as to the "ability" and "means and resources" of the Bureau.

As to "impediments," I know of none which I cannot overcome, except the persistent and continuous interference with our workmen on account of military operations. If this source of disorganization and weakness be not finally disposed of, there is no possibility of sustaining the operations of the Bureau.

The "Special Report" of December 31st, No. 2, shows that 800 men must be added to our force of mechanics at the armories; and Report No. 3 shows that about 3,691 men liable to military duty, and about 2,245 slaves, are required for the *whole* operations of the Bureau. These are minimum figures. If these men and slaves can be permanently attached to this Bureau, and an adequate force be attached in the same manner to the Nitre and Mining Bureau, I will answer for the supply of ordnance and ordnance stores to the army. It will, however, be necessary that the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments co-operate in so far as the feeding and clothing of this force is concerned. This is rendered necessary because these departments enjoy almost a monopoly of the resources for food and clothing in the country.

There is wanted, therefore, for home production—

1st. A force of workmen adequate to the production of a minimum supply of ordnance and ordnance stores for the army. This force is shown in paper No. 3.

2d. That this force should be permanently attached to the Bureau, and in no way liable to be interfered with by any one.

3d. That a minimum supply of food and clothing should be furnished by the Subsistence and Quartermaster Departments.

The "impediments" to the importation of such supplies as must still come from abroad, must be overcome, as they arise, by individual energy and resource.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. GORGAS, *Brigadier-General,*
Chief of Ordnance.

[Copy.]

ANNUAL REPORT NO. 1.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Richmond, Va., October 13, 1864.

Hon. J. A. SEDDON, *Secretary of War*:

I have the honor to present the following general view of the operations of my department for the year ending September 30, and of its present condition and prospects. I refer briefly to the more important branches of supply:

Small Arms—The chief supply has been from importations, which, since the loss of the vessels belonging to this Bureau, have been very light, not to exceed say on this side of the Mississippi 30,000 during the year, included in this report. The number manufactured is about 20,000, instead of 50 to 60,000, as I anticipated. The reduced product is due to the interference of military operations, both of the enemy and our own. The captures have been about 45,000, and the losses about 30,000, leaving a gain of 15,000. The stock of arms in the arsenals is about the same as it was one year ago. If we place the diminution of our military force at 50,000 men (including reserves, local forces, militia, &c.), the aggregate of these figures [30,000 imported+20,000 made+15,000 captured+50,000 less troops=115,000] will represent the waste of arms during the year. About 20,000 are now on the way from Europe, and 50,000 more have been ordered purchased. A further purchase of at least 50,000 will be necessary for the coming year, unless the operations of the armories can be placed on a permanent footing by declaring all *skilled mechanics* engaged on them absolutely exempt from military duty, attaching them permanently to the Ordnance Department, and encouraging in every way the growth of this class of workmen. I cannot lay too much stress on the necessity for legislative action on this point, in order to give *assurance* to the workmen.

Powder—The mechanical means of the Bureau for the production of powder are ample for a war conducted on any scale, and are so arranged as to be almost beyond casualty. The supply depends alone on that of saltpetre and sulphur, and for the present on the former. While we must still depend on importation as our chief supply of nitre, it will be indispensable that the efforts of the Nitre and Mining Bureau be sustained, in order that the home production may be assured. A certain force of white and black labor ought to be permanently assigned to this duty of procuring nitre and sulphur and the other operations of the Nitre and Mining Bureau.

Lead—The expenditure of small-arm ammunition has been very heavy, and has exhausted all our efforts to accumulate a supply of this precious material. I feel more uneasiness on this point than on all others. The requisitions have, however, been fully met, through the energy of the Nitre and Mining Bureau and our own exertions in gleaning the battle-fields.

Artillery—The supply of field artillery has been adequate to the

demand, and the quality very good. The quality of the rifled ammunition is susceptible of improvement. From deficiency in the supply of copper the manufacture of bronze field pieces is suspended, and an iron gun, tightly banded, substituted for the 12-pounder Napoleon, which gives entire satisfaction. Harness and equipments have not been deficient.

Cavalry—Good cavalry arms are much needed. Here again the removal of an armory (for military reasons) and the want of workmen have crippled the Bureau.

The seacoast defences have been supplied with a large number of 10 and 8-inch columbiads and some heavy rifled and banded guns. The want of transportation for iron and coal from Selma to Macon has paralyzed the operations of the foundry for heavy guns established at Macon.

I regret, too, that military operations about Richmond have prevented the carting of 12-inch guns, the preparations for which are now completed. A few guns of this calibre at Wilmington would have been of inestimable advantage in defence against monitors.

Mechanics, Miners, Artizans, &c.—While the army has been well supplied during the past year, there are causes operating which will render future results less satisfactory. The chief of these is the diminution of skilled workmen. Without statistics I can only assure you that the number and quality of workmen have greatly fallen off since the middle of the year 1863. While two years ago it was difficult to get machinery, we have now a surplus, and cannot get workmen to run it. This opens a most melancholy prospect, and indicates an evil that cannot be too soon corrected. While we are importing workmen by twos, they are leaving us by the hundred. I formerly reported to you that from Christmas, 1863, to May, 1864, fifty-five men left our (Government) workshop in Richmond. This may give a glimpse of the exodus.

Nor is it that this class of men is disaffected or unpatriotic that they leave the country. When called on they have fought, and fought well. Out of one battalion of say 200 workmen from the armory here, four were killed and died of their wounds, and some eight or ten wounded in a skirmish. But workmen will not fight and work both. This must be accepted as settled in their minds.

I trust the policy of the War Department may be modified towards these men, for the sake of results as to home production, and that legislative action will secure to these men exemption from military service while in the employ of the Government.

I have heretofore urged that this Bureau and the Nitre and Mining Bureau should have a definite number of mechanics, miners and other *skilled labor* assigned to them, and that the usual bi-monthly returns be rendered by these Bureaux for them—thus placing such force exclusively under the control of the Chiefs of those Bureaux. Considering the vital nature of the operations confided to these two Bureaux, I again urge this proposition.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. GORGAS, *Chief of Ordnance.*

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 2.

C. S. A. WAR DEPARTMENT,
Ordnance Bureau,
 Richmond, December 31, 1864.

Honorable JAMES A. SEDDON, *Secretary of War:*

Sir—In reply to your enquiry for “information as to the means of supplying munitions of war,” confining the answer to the munitions furnished by this Bureau to the Trans-Mississippi, I have the honor to state

1st. As to arms—

There are enough arms on hand of a mixed character—that is, arms most of which are not as good as those now in the hands of troops in the field—to arm and equip some additional force. The returns of November, 1864, showed on hand at the various arsenals and depots—

Rifles of calibre 58.....	3,882
Rifles of calibre 54.....	2,759
Smoothbore muskets 69.....	3,564
All other infantry arms.....	10,504
Carbines.....	2,546

This amount can be probably increased by ten or twelve thousand by a vigorous system of collecting the arms scattered about through the country.

Importations—We have hitherto had no difficulty in importing arms through the blockaded seaports. The total importations for the year have been—

Rifles.....	39,798
Pistols.....	1,716
Carbines.....	4,740

The want of funds necessary to purchase has greatly limited the importations of the expiring year. There are probably not more than ten or twelve thousand on the Islands awaiting shipment.

Manufactured—The number of arms manufactured and made up of parts derived from capture and other sources for the year ending November 30th, 1864, were:

Rifles, calibre 58.....	12,778
Carbines.....	5,354
Pistols.....	2,353

There is machinery enough under the control of this Bureau to manufacture 55,000 rifles and carbines per annum, provided a sufficient mechanical force be employed, as follows:

Richmond Armory.....	25,000	rifles,	with	450	workmen.
Fayetteville “.....	10,000	“	“	250	“
Columbia, S. C. Armory.....	4,000	“	“	125	“
Athens, Ga. Armory.....	10,000	“	“	250	“
Tallassee, Ala. Armory.....	6,000	carbines,		150	“
	55,000			1,225	

The *proviso* is the workmen, and these must be permanently attached to those establishments and excused from the performance

of all military duty, except, perhaps, local guard duty. The number *actually* employed is about 425, about 300 less than were employed say twelve months since. Defection from service in the local forces and losses on the battle-field have thus greatly reduced our force of workmen. By General Order No. 82, over 700 men were placed in the ranks. Of these, perhaps, one-half were competent mechanics, many of them valuable for the service of the armories.

The product could not *at once* be raised to the maximum figures above indicated, but could with the 800 additional workmen be so raised, allowing for the time it would take to teach and organize them.

For our cavalry arms we have chiefly to rely on importations, although pistols are being made at several points with success. Want of workmen alone prevents additional results.

Sabres can be produced in sufficient numbers and of pretty good quality by the detail of a very few workmen from the field.

2d. As to powder—

The manufacturing capacity at the disposal of the Bureau is ample for all purposes, viz:

Augusta Mills.....	5,000 lbs, per day.
Selma Mills.....	500 "
Raleigh Mills.....	600 "
Richmond Mills (in a few weeks).....	1,500 "
Total.....	7,600 "

There is besides a private mill at Charlotte, North Carolina, and an excellent mill belonging to the Navy Department at Columbia, South Carolina. The products could be nearly doubled by running the mills day and night.

The quantity of small arms ammunition in the hands of the troops in the field is about eighty to ninety rounds to the man. The most obstinate and protracted battles, such as Chancellorsville and Gettysburg exhibit an expenditure of about twenty-five rounds per man for the former battle and about thirty rounds per man for the latter. The quantity of small arms ammunition on hand at the several arsenals and depots shows an aggregate of 5,376,034 small arm cartridges on the 12th November.

There are 50,480 rounds of siege and seacoast projectiles and 133,962 rounds of field artillery ammunition on hand same date. No uneasiness is felt on this head, provided the supply of powder (dependent on saltpetre) is kept up. As to the means of keeping up the supply of saltpetre, and the date in reference to production and importation, I beg leave to refer you to the Nitre and Mining Bureau.

The chief detriment the operations of the Bureau has had has arisen from interference with its workmen for military purposes.

(Signed)

J. GORGAS, Brigadier-General,

Chief of Ordnance.

No. 3.

C. S. A. WAR DEPARTMENT,
Ordnance Bureau,
 Richmond, February 2d, 1865.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS (WHITE AND SLAVE) MADE.

(Copy.)

Honorable J. A. SEDDON, *Secretary of War*:

Sir—In answer to the following extract of a resolution of the Senate of the 24th May, * * * "First: With information as to the number of white men between the ages of 18 and 45, and of the number of negroes who in addition to their own officers may be required for the necessary employment and the proper discharge of the functions of the department of * * * the Ordnance Bureau * * * " I have the honor to submit that there were borne on the rolls of this department on the 1st October, 1864, 3,433 white men, between the ages of 18 and 45, including contractors and their employees. General Order No. 82 reduced this number to 2,691, turning over to the enrolling officers 742. Of this number thus turned over, full one-half were mechanics of the classes now needed to push our work. There must be returned say 400. This will leave the working force at the arsenals less by about 342 men than on the 1st of October, but will suffice. In addition, in order to raise the product of our armories in time to 55,000 arms per annum, 800 good mechanics must be added—say that three-fourths of them will be white men, between the ages of 18 and 45, and the total required thus will be—

Number in workshops December 31	2,691
Number of them taken by General Order to be returned	400
Number to be added for additional product of arms	600
	<hr/> 3,961

This would give us a total of 258 more workmen than we had October 1, 1864, but would raise the product of arms from 20,000 to 55,000 (in time). The number of negroes on the rolls of the department during the past year is 830; add to them, say 1,000 in the employ of contractors, of which there are no returns in the office, making 1,830 negroes. An addition of fifty per cent. should be made to that part of the force employed at the arsenals, &c., in order that as much as possible may be done with labor of this description, making 1,245 as the number needed at these establishments. This estimate is reduced to the smallest figures with which the operations of the Bureau can be successfully carried on.

RECAPITULATION.

White men, between the ages of 18 and 45 (excepting officers),	3,691
Slaves	2,245

Very respectfully,
 (Signed) J. GORGAS, Brigadier-General,
Chief of Ordnance.

Editorial Paragraphs.

In sending out this first number of our second volume, there are several things we deem it appropriate to say :

1. We thank our friends and the public generally for the very kind reception they have been pleased to give our *Papers*. The press throughout the South, and many of the Northern papers, have been exceedingly kind in their notices. We have received numerous private letters from distinguished Confederates, warmly commending our enterprise, and testifying to the interest and value of our publications; and the steady increase of our subscription list attests the growing popularity of our monthly.

2. We are exceedingly anxious to largely increase our subscription list, in order that we may extend the sphere of our usefulness, and have the means of making certain improvements in our *Papers*. If each one of our subscribers would secure us *one new name*, we would at once double our list. We beg our friends to interest themselves in this matter, and to swell our list either by personal solicitation, or by sending us the names of reliable agents who will canvass for us.

3. We think that a casual reference to the table of contents of our first volume will show that our publications thus far have possessed both popular interest and historic value. But we may safely promise that our issues will be even more interesting and valuable in the months to come. We have scarcely touched the rich collection of MSS. already on our shelves, and we have the promise of other papers of deep interest and great historic value from some of the ablest of the men who made our Confederate history.

4. We feel, then, that we do not transcend the limits of becoming editorial modesty when we cordially congratulate the Society on the past success and future prospects of their enterprise.

OUR JANUARY NUMBER ran out several months ago. We had a second edition printed, and that too has been exhausted for several weeks, so that a large number of our subscribers have not yet received it. We will, however, have a third edition ready in a few days, and all can be supplied.

We are now stereotyping all of our issues, and will in future have no difficulty in supplying as many back numbers as may be wanted.

BOUND VOLUMES of our *Papers* for the first six months of our issue can now be supplied at the following rates :

Cloth.....	\$2 00
Half Morocco.....	2 25
Half Calf.....	2 50

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